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SUMMARY: Whether a warrantless search, based upon probable 
D .,ov .. ~t vo.' cause, of a closed but 
~" (., \"'\ ~ ~~~~ resp's automobile during a lawful search of the automobile, was 
~~ v-·t.l t \,c)-\ -
\~ ~J..~ permissible under the Fourth Amendment. 
' 'vi' ~~"~ r. ~V FACTS: A D.C. police detective was told by a reliable 
~/ "''"'\ 
~,.. informant that he had observed a man selling nar:otics from the 
DEN~)~~~~~~~~ 
1/ ,, 
unsealed paper bag, found in the trunk of 
-2-
trunk of an automobile. Upon arriving in the area, the detective 
and two other police officers observed a vehicle being driven by 
resp matching the informant's description. The officers 
determined that it was registered to resp. They then stopped the 
vehicle, identified themselves, and asked resp to step out. A 
police officer spotted a round of ammunition on the front seat of 
the car and, upon searching the interior of the vehicle for 
weapons, found a pistol in the glove compartment. 
After resp was arrested, another officer unlocked and 
searched the vehicle's trunk. In it he discovered a brown paper 
lunch bag with a folded but unsealed top, ~d a zippered leather 
pouch. He opened the paper bag and discovered in it a number of 
~ 
glassine envelopes, each containing a white powder. Leaving the 
paper bag and the leather pouch in the trunk, the officers drove 
resp's automobile to the police station. At the station the 
officers reopened the paper bag and upon analysis it was found to 
contain a quantity of heroin. One of the officers then opened 
the leather pouch and found that it contained $3,200 in currency. 
No search warrant had been obtained at any point in this sequence 
of events. 
The resp was indicted by a federal grand jury on charges 
including possession with intent to distribute a controlled 
substance. A motion to suppress evidence was made and denied 
after a hearing by the district judge. Resp was convicted of the 
possession with intent to distribute charge. On appeal, a panel 
of the CA DC reversed the conviction, holding that the search of 
the leather pouch without a warrant violated resp's Fourth 
-3-
Amendment rights. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979). A 
majority of the panel upheld legality of the warrantless search 
involving the paper bag because paper bags offer only minimal 
protection against intrusion and, given their conventional uses, 
are not inevitably associated with an expectation of privacy. 
DECISION BELOW: Acting upon resp's suggestion, theCA 
granted rehearing en bane. In an opinion joined by seven of its 
members, the majority of the court rejected the panel's 
conclusion that the warrantless search of the unsealed paper bag 
was permissible.l In an opinion by Judge Ginsburg, the majority -
of the en bane court agreed that although resp's car was properly 
stopped and searched and that the paper bag and leather pouch 
properly seized, no "special exigencies" justified opening the --- , ~'' - .. .. 
' pouch or the bag without a warrant and that no other 
"established, well-drawn exception" to the warrant requirement 
was applicable. The court declined to adopt what was termed "an 
unworthy container rule," in part because of the administrative 
infeasibility of such a rule and in part because "it would snare 
those without the means or the sophistication to use worthy 
containers." The en bane court thus perceived no distinction 
between the pouch and the bag in a manner that "makes theoretical 
1 On rehearing en bane the Government did not challenge 
the panel's ruling regarding the warrantless search of the 
leather pouch on its merfts. The Government did argue that 
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 u.s. 753 (1979), should not have been 
applied retroactively to the search in i~sue, and that, for that 
reason, none of the evidence should have been suppressed. The CA 
rejected that argument, and the Government has not sought review 
of that decision in this petition. 
• 
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or practical sense." They concluded that the contents of the 
paper bag, as well as those of the leather pouch, should have 
been suppressed. 
Four members of the court dissented. Judge Tamm, who had 
written the panel opinion, adhered to his original reasoning and 
conclusions in an opinion joined by Judges McKinnon and Robb, 
each of whom wrote separately as well. Judge McKinnon would have 
upheld the warrantless search of the leather pouch as well as the 
paper bag and would accordingly have affirmed a conviction. 
Judge Robb thought that this Court's decisions required 
suppression of the leather pouch but that "this result does not 
make sense." Judge Wilkey issued a separate 67-page dissent on 
the ground that Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 u.s. 753 (1979), was not 
properly applied retroactively to the search at issue. He, 
however, would have joined the majority as to the issues on the 
merits, reluctantly concluding that Arkansas v. Sanders controls 
this case and criticizing both the decision in Sanders and the 
exclusionary rule. Judge McKinnon joined Judge Wilkey's dissent 
with respect to the retroactivity issue. 
CONTENTIONS: The SG, in a petition filed before this 
Court's decision in Robbins v. California, 49 U.S.L.W. 4906 
(July 1, 1981), contends that the case presents an important and 
recurring question similar to that in Robbins. The decision of 
the en bane CA DC that there is no distinction between 
conventional types of luggage and an unsealed paper bqg is 
contrary to the decisions of eight other CA's, which have 
declined to extend a warrant requirement to paper bags and 
: -5-
similar insubstantial containers.2 While acknowledging that this 
Court has twice held that a warrant is required before law 
I( \ 
enforcement officials may search luggage found in a vehicle, 
:> 
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 762-766 (suitcase): United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (double locked footlocker), 
the Court has cautioned that "not all containers and packages Js~ .. ~ 
found by police during the course of a search will deserve the 
full protection of the Fourth Amendment." 442 u.s. at 764, 765 
n. 13. 
Factors traditionally employed to determine the scope of 
Fourth Amendment protection suggests that the very nature of 
unsealed paper bags and similar containers is inconsistent with 
the reasonable expectation that their contents will be protected 
from public exposure. Paper bags and similar packages offer at 
best only minimal protection against accidental or deliberate 
intrusion. Moreover, while a common bag may at times be pressed 
into services or a repository for personal effects, such 
unrepresentative use is not part of the conventional 
2 See United States v. Goshorn, 628 F.2d 697 (1st Cir. 
1980) (plastic and paper bags): United States v. Mannino, 635 
F.2d 110 (CA 2 1980) (plastic bag): United States v. Markland, 
635 F.2d 174 (CA 2 1980) (beverage bag): United States v. Bush, 
No. 80-1116 (CA 3 Mar. 24, 1981) (unsealed cardboard box): United 
States v. Sutton, 636 F.2d 96 (CA 5 1981) (pharmacy bag): United 
States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207 (CA 6 1980) (closed paper bag): 
United States v. Jimenez, 626 F.2d 39 (CA 7 1980) (paper bag): 
United States v. Mackey, 626 F.2d 684 (CA 9 1980) (paper bag): 
United States v. Gooch, 603 F.2d 122 (CA 10 1979) (plastic bags 
of marijuana): but see United States v. Moschetta, 646 F.2d 955 
(CA 5 1981) (paper bag): United States v. Dien, 609 F~2d 1038 (CA 
2 1979) (sealed box, warrant required) , adhered to on rehearing, 
615 F. 2d 10 ( 1980) . 
. 
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"understandings that are recognized and permitted by society," 
which are the touchstone for assessing the scope of Fourth 
Amendment protection. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 u.s. 128, 144 n. 12 
(1978). 
Resp Ross, writing after this Court decided Robbins and New 
York v. Belton, 49 U.S.L.W. 4915 (July 1, 1981), argues that 
given these recent cases, along with Chadwick and Sanders, the 
circuit courts now have sufficient guidance from this Court in 
determining whether warrants are necessary to search various 
containers located in the trunk areas of vehicles. Robbins, 
which held that a closed opaque container found in a vehicle 
cannot be searched without a warrant, unless its contents are in 
plain view or could be inferred from their outward appearance, 
should controlthis case. Resp notes the plurality opinion's 
' reference to United States v. Ross in commenting "what one person 
may put into a suitcase, another may put into a paper bag." It 
should not matter whether the paper bag was merely closed as 
opposed to being taped shut. Resp also thinks it significant 
that the paper bag was stored in the locked trunk of the vehicle, 
since containers placed in the luggage compartment should be 
entitled to a greater expectation of privacy after New York v. 
Belton held that police may examine the contents of any 
containers found in the passenger compartment of a car upon a 
lawful custodial arrest. In short, resp contends that the 
instant case was properly decided. 
DISCUSSION: I believe that the case is controlled by the 
~ plurality opinion in Robbins. Both there and here the container 
-7-
at issue was closed and opaque. The rationale of Robbins -- that 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish objective 
criteria by which to distinguish between subtantial and 
insubstantial containers -- applies here with equal force. 
Footnote 13 of the Sanders' opinion, upon which the SG relies, 
was interpreted in Robbins to exclude only containers whose 
contents can be inferred from their outward appearance or which 
are open to plain view. I do not see how Robbins allows for a 
1 distinction between an unsealed paper bag and a taped parcel. 
The only justification for review, therefore, would be to 
consider whether the automobile exception, Chambers v. Maroney, 
399 u.s. 42 (1970), should be expanded to allow for the 
warrantless search of all containers found within an automobile. 
The difficulty inherent in distinguishing between permissible and 
impermissible warrantless searches and the burden on law 
enforcement officials to hold and transport automobiles while 
seeking warrants 
which affords "an opportunity for more thorough consideration of 
the basic principles" leading to "some better, if more radical, 
solution to the confusion that infects this benighted area of the 
law." Robbins v. California, 49 U.S.L.W. at 4910 (Opinion of 
POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment). 
Unless the Court wishes to engage in such basic 
reconsideration, I believe that cert should be denied. 
There is a response. 
8/5/81 
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IY MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 80-2209- United States v. Ross J p· Z-1 
In order to implement Byron's suggestion, I 
propose the following form of order: 
"Certiorari granted. The parties are directed 
to address the question whether the Court should 












JUSTICE WH. J . BRENNAN, JR. 
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September 30, 1981 
RE: No. 80-2209 United States v. Ross 
Dear John:· 




cc: The Conference 
... 
: 
CHAMBERS O F 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
iln:prtmt QJqurt of tlt't ,-mttb iltatts 
jluqittghnt. ~. <If. 211p~~ 
September 30, 1981 
Re: No. 80-2209 United States v. Ross 
Dear John: 
The order you propose in your memo of September 29th 
is agreeable to me. 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely, ,_,., 
.' !, 1'..( 
: 
CHAMBERS OF 
USTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.:§npume <qcurt 1tf tlp• ~1tfu~ ~fah>g 
~ltlllfhtgton.tB. <!f. 2ilc?.ll-.;l 
Re: No. 80-2209 - United States v. Ross 
Dear John: 
The proposed form of order has my approval. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
/ 
September 30, 1981 
... 
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September 30, 1981 
80-2209 United qtates v. Ross 
Dear John: 
The proposed form of order has my approval. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
------------·-·"---··· '-------------'"'----
September 30, 1981 
.:§ltp"rttttt ~onrl a-f flrt ~nittlt .;§taftg 
~a$Lrbt~fon, ~· <!f. 2ll?J1~ 
MEMO TO: Justice John Paul Stevens 
FROM: Justice Sandra D. O'Connor 
RE: 80-2209 - United States v. Ross 
I agree with the proposed form of order. Perhaps it 
would help to add the following language at the end : 
"in addition to any other questions 
raised in the petition." 
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Re: No. 80-2209 - United States v. Ross 
Dear John: 
I agree with the September 29 proposed order. 
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Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
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Motion to Dispense with 
Printing the Joint Appendix 
SUMMARY: The SG, as petr, seeks leave to dispense with the 
requirement of a joint appendix. The SG maintains that the facts 
of this search and seizure case are fully set forh in the en bane 
CA opinion which already appears in the appendix of the cert petn. 
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80-2209 
No. 
AB SENT NOT VOTING 
jsw 
.) 
No. 80-2209: u.s. v. Ross / 
Question Presented 
Whether police were required to obtain a warrant to 
search a paper bag found in the trunk of a car that they had 
probable cause to search. 
Discussion 
This area of law has been very troubling for the 
Court. As you have made clear, the Court faces the dual re-
sponsibili ty of principled decisionmaking as well as minimal 
institutional unity -- so as to provide daily guidance for the 
hundreds of thousands of law enforcement personnel who are ex-




I see four alternative ways to resolve this case. I 
list and discuss each. 
1. Robbins theory 
This resolution would simply reaffirm Robbins' holding 
that search of any closed and opaque container require a war-
rant. This position is urged by resp and by the ACLU as ami-
cus. WJB, BRW, and TM also can be expected to adhere to their 
Robbins plurality vote for this theory. 
The advantage of this theory is its "bright line" 
character. It makes the empirical generalization that persons 
have an expectation of privacy in any closed and opaque con-
tainer. People vary in their assessment about this generaliza-
tion's validity, and hence its cost (in terms of inaccuracy 
stemming from protecting packages that embody little or no ex-
pectation of privacy). My own view is that the generalization 
probably is quite valid. I think one safely can assume that 
most closed containers by their very nature -- do evidence 
the owner's expectation of privacy. 
I expect you will disagree. Your Robbins statement, 
together with materials in the Chamber's Robbins file, makes 
clear you view many containers as too flimsy or inconsequential 
to support this "privacy of container contents" generalization. 
Under this view, the generalization creates high law enforce-
ment costs with no corresponding or offsetting benefit from 
protection of privacy expectations. The "bright line" thus is 
-'· 
simply too costly to justify whatever administrative savings it 
may make possible. 
The other great problem with this position is votes. 
You have made plain your laudable concern with the Court's in-
stitutional responsibility to provide unified guidance in this 
area. Only four Justices wholeheartedly supported the Robbins 
theory last Term. One of these votes -- PS 's -- may well 
change; SOC, one may speculate, is apt to depart from PS's per-
spective on this issue. Therefore, even if you changed your 
view and supported it, the Robbins theory probably could not 
provide a basis for consensus in this case. 
2. Arkansas v. Sanders theory 
This theory reasons that ability to search containers 
does not depend on whether a container is or is not in a car. 
The theoretical framework is that set forth (eloquently, I 
think) in Chadwick (requiring warrant for police station search 
of 200 lb. locker placed in open car trunk) and Arkansas v. 
Sanders (requiring warrant for search of green suitcase full of 
marihuana in taxicab trunk). That is, whether a warrant is 
required would depend on whether an expectation of privacy in-
heres in the container to be searched, not on whether the con-
tainer was near an auto. A vote to reverse in this case would 
employ this logic but would distinguish the result in Chadwick 
and Sanders on the grounds you set forth in your Robbins state-
ment: that double-locked footlockers and personal luggage con-
~. 
vey evidence of an expectation of privacy that a paper bag does 
not. The SG advocates this approach (in the alternative). See 
SG brief at 9, 14-37. Although this approach could be made 
consistent with Robbins' result (because the package there was 
wrapped and sealed, and hence could be said to exhibit an ex-
pectation of privacy), it would require the overruling of Rob-
bins' expansive "all containers are inviolate" reasoning. 
The great advantage of this position is that it rests 
solidly on sound Fourth Amendment theory: the centrality of 
expectation of privacy as a guide to the reasonableness of 
searches. Also, the approach is perfectly consistent with the 
result and the reasoning in Chadwick and with your opinion in 
Sanders. 
A disadvantage of this approach is administrability. 
Because of the infinite variety of containers, close factual 
distinctions would be unavoidable. The concept of "expectation 
of privacy" necessarily is abstract. And the competence of 
courts to judge general social attitudes about privacy is lim-
ited. Therefore some of the distinctions courts will have to 
make will begin to appear arbitrary (as in this case, for in-
stance, where a zippered leather pouch has been found private, 
but a paper bag has been found not private). This arbitrari-
ness and unpredictability makes law enforcement difficult for 
police. It may increase general cynicism about the overall 
---., 
state of search and seizure law. Additionally, there is a pos-
sible economic aspect; the poor may utilize flimsy containers 
't':,.. <:' •• 
__,. 
::Jo 
more frequently because they cannot afford more expensive re-
ceptacles. The Court no doubt should avoid warrant rules that 
can be accused of determining privacy rights on grounds that 
correlate with income level. 
These objections can be exaggerated. Moreover, even 
if the Court can avoid the need to make such container distinc-
tions in the auto context, presumably it still will have to 
make such distinctions in non-auto search contexts. To that 
extent the problem is inevitable. 
Nevertheless, in the auto context these concerns ap-
parently have moved WJB, BRW, TM, HAB, WHR, and JPS to seek 
"bright line" rules (of some type) to avoid the "substantial 
container" inquiry. Significantly, no other Justice joined 
your Robbins concurrence, which advocated this general ap-
preach. I therefore conclude that the Sanders theory, despite 
its advantages, is unlikely to produce consensus in this case. 
3. Carroll theory --------
This approach is th 
that the rationale of Carroll 
It reasons 
267 u.s. 132 
(1925) (creating the "auto exception") applies also to any con-
tainers found within an auto. Under this approach, police who 
properly could search an auto also properly could search con-
tainers that they discover anywhere in the auto. This course 
is advocated by the SG in the alternative (SG brief at 13-14: 
41-47) and by the amici Americans for Effective Law Enforcement 
,, 
b. 
and International Ass'n of Chiefs of Police. This theory would 
require the reversal of Robbins in both reasoning and result. 
The transcendent advantage of this approach is its 
popularity. VHAB,\7WHR, ~ have already endorsed this ap-
proach. 
clined. 
It would not surprise me if SOC was similarly in-
In this case, you would be the fifth vote. I also 
would not be surprised if the CJ went along with this theory. 
He concurred without public comment in the Robbins result. 
Privately he expressed his dissatisfaction with the exclusion-
ary rule, according to our file, and stated he was "about pre-
pared to support an 'automobile exception' that leaves little 
room for confusion • " See 6/26/81 WEB memo in Robbins 
file. This, of course, was before his final decision simply to 
concur in the result without comment. Nonetheless, I think the 
prospects for a 6 vote majority are reasonably good, if you 
decide this course is palatable. 
The main problem with this course is your opinion in 
Sanders. You previously have noted that the holdings in both 
Sanders and Chadwick can be squared with an expansion of the 
auto exception to cover cases like that at bar. The police in 
Sanders and Chadwick suspected the particular container before 
there was any contact with a car. 1 Police apprehended the car 
1The factual settings in both cases did involve cars in limited 
ways. In Chadwick the police suspected the 200 lb. footlocker --
through observation and dog alert -- before the footlocker was 
placed (and "arrested") in the open car trunk. In Sanders the 
police had information leading them to suspect the green suitcase 
Footnote continued on next page. 
·. 
only in order to obtain the container, not the car itself. In 
this case, however, police suspected that Ross' car contained 
contraband but had no reason to believe that that contraband 
was secreted inside a container that would have enjoyed an ex-
pectation of privacy outside of the car. 
But while consistent in result, Sanders' reasoning 
squarely rejected the precise Carroll theory now under discus-
sion. 442 U.S. at 762. This rejection was made for reasons ,___ 
that ring very true to my ear in 1982. See 442 U.S. at 762-65. 
I think your Sanders opinion is dead right, and is an important 
protection for personal rights. I am very proud of the United 
States' constitutional control on the coercive power of police 
authority. The admittedly high cost of upholding the principle 
has measured its importance to us as a nation. Few, if any, 
other countries can boast of such careful regard for individual 
liberty and autonomy. I therefore would grieve over the renun-
ciation of Sanders' reasoning. 
Another difficulty with Carroll approach to this case 
is the logical tangle that will result from barring warrantless 
container searches outside but permitting them inside of cars. 
~'" . ..1 .to Obviously there will be messy factual lines for oc7~o draw when 
cars are searched just as containers enter or exit an auto. 
More troubling is the possibility that police may abuse a Car-
before it was carried to a taxi and placed in the taxi's trunk . 
. . . 
u. 
roll auto container search exception by waiting to pounce until 
a suspected container is placed inside a car. JPS faced this 
problem in footnote 9 of his Robbins dissent. See 101 S.Ct. at 
2857-58 n.9. He stated that: 
Of course, a proper application of the automo-
bile exception will uphold a search of a con-
tainer located in a car only if the police 
have probable cause to search the entire car. 
If, as in Sanders, the police have probable 
cause only as to a suitcase, and not as to the 
entire car, then the automobile exception is 
inapplicable and a warrant is required unless 
some other exigency exists. Thus police would 
not be able to avoid a warrant requirement 
simply by waiting for the suspect to place an 
object in a car and then invoking the automo-
bile exception. If, however, the occupants of 
a car have an opportunity to take contraband 
out of a sui tease and secrete it somewhere 
else in a car, see Sanders . {Blackmun, 
J., dissenting), then I would conclude that 
police have probable cause to search the en-
tire car, including the suitcase, without a 
warrant {emphasis added). 
This approach has its difficulties. It may take but a 
few seconds to "take contraband out of a suitcase and secrete 
it . . . . " Therefore the potential for police to abuse this 
extension of the auto exception seems quite large, given that 
most contraband is movable and that virtually everything in our 
society moves by motor vehicle. Police need only watch a sus-
pect container of contraband enter a car and then wait a few 
seconds. Then they can inspect without a warrant a container 
that they could have searched only with a warrant a few seconds 
earlier. Thus the "bright line" advantage carried by the Car-




4. Chimel/Belton theory 
Chimel v. California permits searches of the area 
within the "immediate control" of an ~ested pers~ . Last 
term Belton extended Chimel to hold that a search incident to 
arrest permits police to search the passenger compartments of 
car -- including any containers and closed glove compartments. 
Belton's thinking was that the passenger compartment is the 
region of an arrestee's "immediate control" during an arrest of 
one from a car. 
Resp Ross was arrested in this case. Thus Chimel and -
Belton could be extended to assert that the trunk, as well as 
the passenger compartment, is within the Chimel "immediate con-
trol" area. 
No party advocates this theory in this case, even 
though it offers some attractions. One advantage is that it 
would permit reversal in this case on grounds that are consis-
tent with reasoning and result in Chadwick and Sanders. This 
Chimel logic also would permit Robbins to remain undisturbed: 
@Ob~ explicitly did not involve a lawful arrest. See 101 
S.Ct. at 2847 n.3. These doctrinal consistencies, however, are 
offset by two other problems. 
First, this extension would stretch the Chimel reason-
ing to the breaking point. It is very difficult to say with a 
straight face that the interior of a locked trunk is within the 
area of immediate control of one just arrested from the passen-
ger compartment. 
-
Perhaps more importantly, this reasoning splits 




rationale for the search is arrest. But nothing requires the 
arrest to be related to the container suspicion. In other 
words, such a rule could tempt police into making pretextual 
arrests for trivial traffic offenses, simply to gain the right 
to search containers in a car and its trunk. Justice Stevens 
used logic of this sort to criticize effectively this Chimel 
approach in his Robbins dissent. See 101 s.ct. at 2858-59. 
Conclusion 
In the best of all possible worlds, .!!!.Y_ personal view 
is that the Robbins approach should be reaffirmed and thus the 
CADC judgment in this case should itself be affirmed. But you 
have made clear your view that insubstantial containers in fact 
do not inevitably evidence an expectation of privacy. Given 
your belief that paper bags may be searched without a warrant, 
the CADC must be reversed. 
In the best of all possible worlds, I expect that ~ 
would prefer to reverse on the Arkansas v. Sanders theory of 
container-type-by-container-type of weighing of privacy inter-
h I ,.,..-, ~_ ~ ests. But this approach, despite its doctrinal appeal, as a rv~-very slight chance of commanding majority support. 
The second next position is expansion of the Carroll 
auto exception. This requires overruling the result in Robbins 
and the reasoning in Arkansas v. Sanders, and it is not free of 
11. 
logical ironies. But in general it seems a workable approach. 
Importantly, it stands a good chance of winning 6-3 support. 
Finally, I think the Court should reject any reliance 
on a Chimel theory. No party advocates this view. It would 
tear doctrine and reduce personal liberties with the advantage 
only of preserving consistency with Chadwick, Sanders, and Rob-
bins. 
You may wish to remain flexible at Conference. A pos-
sible course would be to express a preference for what I have 
have labelled the Sanders theory, but to mention that you will 
join 4 or 5 to reverse on a Carroll approach. 
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March 3, 1982 
Dear Chief: 
My vote in this case is to reverse. 
I would reach this conclusion under the analysis of my 
concurring opinion last Term in Robbins. I agree with the 
SG that one has no reasonable expectat1on of privacy in a 
paper bag of the type involved in this case. It was not 
sealed and there was no other evidence of a privacy 
expectation. 
There are five votes to adopt the Carroll automobile 
exception: that wherever there is probable cause to search 
an automobile, the entire vehicle and all of its contents 
may be searched without a warrant. I do not think this 
would require reversal of Chadwick and Sanders for the 
reasons you and I have stated. It would require reversal of 
Robbins, as well as a rejection of the line of reasoning 
stated in my concurring opinion in that case. 
In these circumstances, I must decide whether to adhere 
to the views I expressed last Term in Robbins or join an 
opinion that defines the scope of the automobile search as 
indicated above. I am not at rest as between these choices 
and will await the writing of the Court opinion • 
The Chief Justice 
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in this case is to reverse. 
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exception: that wherever there is Probable cause to search 
an automobile, the entire vehicle and all of its contents 
may be searched without a warrant. t do not think this 
would require reversal of Chadwick and Sanders for the 
reasons you and I have stated. It would require reversal of 
Robbins, as well as a rejection of the line of reasoning 
stated in my concurring opinion in that case. 
In these circumstances, I must decide whether to adhere 
to the views I expressed last Term in Robbins or join an 
opinion that defines the scope of the automobile search as 
indicated above. I am not at rest as between these choices 
and will await the writing of the Court opinion. 
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The Chief Justice 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-2209 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ALBERT ROSS, JR. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1982] 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, the Court held 
that a warrantless search of an automobile stopped by police 
officers who had probable cause to believe the vehicle con-
tained contraband was not unreasonable within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment. The Court in Carroll did not ex-
plicitly address the scope of the search that is permissible. 
In this case, we consider the extent to which police officers-
who have legitimately stopped an automobile and who have 
p~cause to believe that contraband is concealed some-
where within it-may conduct a probing search of compart-
ments and containers within the vehicle whose contents are 
not in plain view. We hold that they may conduct a search of 
the vehicle that is as thorough as a magistrate could autho-
rize in a warrant "particularly describing the place to be 
searched." ' 
I 
In the evening of November 27, 1978, an informant who 
had previously proved to be reliable telephoned Detective 
'"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized." U. S. Canst., Arndt. 4. 
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Marcum of the District of Columbia Police Department and 
told him that an individual known as "Bandit" was selling 
narcotics kept in the trunk of a car parked at 439 Ridge 
Street. The informant stated that he had just observed 
"Bandit" complete a sale and that "Bandit" had told him that 
additional narcotics were in the trunk. The informant gave 
Marcum a detailed description of "Bandit" and stated that the 
car was a "purplish maroon" Chevrolet Malibu with District 
of Columbia license plates. 
Accompanied by Detective Cassidy and Sergeant Gon-
zales, Marcum immediately drove to the area and found a ma-
roon Malibu parked in front of 439 Ridge Street. A license 
check disclosed that the car was registered to Albert Ross; a 
computer check on Ross revealed that he fit the informant's 
description and used the alias "Bandit." In two passes 
through the neighborhood the officers did not observe anyone 
matching the informant's description. To avoid alerting per-
sons on the street, they left the area. 
The officers returned five minutes later and observed the 
maroon Malibu turning off Ridge Street onto Fourth Street. 
They pulled alongside the Malibu, noticed that the driver 
matched the informant's description, and stopped the car. 
Marcum and Cassidy told the driver-later identified as Al-
bert Ross, the respondent in this action-to get out of the ve-
hicle. While they searched Ross, Sergeant Gonzales discov-
ered a bullet on the car's front seat. He searched the 
interior of the car and found a pistol in the glove compart-
ment. Ross then was arrested and handcuffed. Detective 
Cassidy took Ross' keys and opened the trunk, where he 
found a closed brown paper bag. He opened the bag and dis-
covered a number of glassine bags containing a white pow-
der. Cassidy replaced the bag, closed the trunk, and drove 
the car to Headquarters. 
At the police station Cassidy thoroughly searched the car. 
In addition to the "lunch-type" brown paper bag, Cassidy 
found in the trunk a zippered red leather pouch. He un-
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zipped the pouch and discovered $3,200 in cash. The police 
laboratory later determined that the powder in the paper bag 
was heroin. No warrant was obtained. 
Ross was charged with possession of heroin with intent to 
distribute, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841(a). Prior to trial, 
he moved to suppress the heroin found in the paper bag and 
the currency found in the leather pouch. After an eviden-
tiary hearing, the District Court denied the motion to sup-
press. The heroin and currency were introduced in evidence 
at trial and Ross was convicted. 
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the 
conviction. It held that the police had probable cause to stop 
and search Ross' car and that, under Carroll v. United 
States, supra, and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, the 
officers lawfully could search the automobile-including its 
trunk-without a warrant. The court considered sepa-
rately, however, the warrantless search of the two containers 
found in the trunk. On the basis of Arkansas v. Sanders, 
442 U. S. 753, the court concluded that the constitutionality 
of a warrantless search of a container found in an automobile 
depends on whether the owner possesses a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in its contents. Applying that test, the 
court held that the warrantless search of the paper bag was 
valid but the search of the leather pouch was not. The court 
remanded for a new trial at which the items taken from the 
paper bag, but not those from the leather pouch, could be 
admitted. 2 
The entire Court of Appeals then voted to rehear the case 
en bane. A majority of the court rejected the panel's conclu-
sion that a distinction of constitutional significance existed 
between the two containers found in respondent's trunk; it 
2 The court rejected the Government's argument that the warrantless 
search of the leather pouch was justified as incident to respondent's arrest. 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 137a. The Government has not challenged this 
holding. 
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held that the police should not have opened either container 
without first obtaining a warrant. The court reasoned: 
"No specific, well-delineated exception called to our 
attention permits the police to dispense with a warrant 
to open and search 'unworthy' containers. Moreover, 
we believe that a rule under which the validity of a war-
rantless search would turn on judgments about the dura-
bility of a container would impose an unreasonable and 
unmanageable burden on police and courts. For these 
reasons, and because the Fourth Amendment protects 
all persons, not just those with the resources or fastidi-
ousness to place their effects in containers that decision-
makers would rank in the luggage line, we hold that the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement forbids the 
warrantless opening of a closed, opaque paper bag to the 
same extent that it forbids the warrantless opening of a 
small unlocked suitcase or a zippered leather pouch." 
655 F. 2d 1159, 1161 (CADC 1981) (footnote omitted). 
The en bane Court of Appeals considered, and rejected, the 
argument that it was reasonable for the police to open both 
the paper bag and the leather pouch because they were enti-
tled to conduct a warrantless search of the entire vehicle in 
which the two containers were found. The majority con-
cluded that this argument was foreclosed by Sanders. 
Three dissenting judges interpreted Sanders differently. 3 
Other courts also have read the Sanders opinion in different 
3 Judge Tamm, the author of the original panel opinion, reiterated the 
view that Sanders prohibited the warrantless search of the leather pouch 
but not the search of the paper bag. Judge Robb agreed that this result 
was compelled by Sanders, although he stated that in his opinion "the right 
to search an automobile should include the right to open any container 
found within the automobile, just as the right to search a lawfully arrested 
prisoner carries with it the right to examine the contents of his wallet and 
any envelope found in his pocket, and the right to search a room includes 
authority to open and search all the drawers and containers found within 
80-2209-0PINION 
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ways. 4 Moreover, disagreement concerning the proper in- J 
terpretation of Sanders was at least partially responsible for 
the fact that Robbins v. California,-- U. S. --,was de-
cided last Term without a Court opinion. 
There is, however, no dispute among judges about the im-
portance of striving for clarification in this area of the law. 
For countless vehicles are stopped on highways and public 
streets every day and our cases demonstrate that it is not un-
common for police officers to have probable cause to believe 
that contraband may be found in a stopped vehicle. In every 
such case a conflict is presented between the individual's con-
stitutionally protected interest in privacy and the public in-
terest in effective law enforcement. No single rule of law 
can resolve every conflict, but our conviction that clarifica-
tion is feasible led us to grant the Government's petition for 
certiorari in this case and to invite the parties to address the 
question whether the decision in Robbins should be reconsid-
ered. -- U. S. --. 
II 
We begin with a review of the decision in Carroll itself. 
In the fall of 1921, federal prohibition agents obtained evi-
dence that George Carroll and John Kiro were "bootleggers" 
who frequently traveled between Grand Rapids and Detroit 
the room." 655 F. 2d, at 1180. Judge MacKinnon concurred with Judge 
Tamm that Sanders did not prohibit the warrantless search of the paper 
bag. Concerning the leather pouch, he agreed with Judge Wilkey, who 
dissented on the ground that Sanders should not be applied retroactively. 
' Many courts have held that Sanders requires that a warrant be ob-
tained only for personal luggage and other "luggage-type" containers. 
See, e. g., United States v. Goshorn, 628 F. 2d 697 (CAl 1980); United 
States v. Brown, 635 F. 2d 1207 (CA6 1980); United States v. Jiminez, 626 
F. 2d 39 (CA 7 1980). One court has held that Sanders does not apply if the 
police have probable cause to search an entire vehicle and not merely an 
isolated container within it. Cf. State v. Bible, 389 So. 2d 42 (La. 1980), 
remanded, - U. S. - ; State v. Hernandez, 408 So. 2d 911 (La. 1981); 
see also United States v. Ross, 655 F. 2d, at 1180 (Robb, J., dissenting). 
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in an Oldsmobile Roadster. 5 On December 15, 1921, the 
agents unexpectedly encountered Carroll and Kiro driving 
west on that route in that car. The officers gave pursuit, 
stopped the roadster on the highway, and requested Carroll 
and Kiro to get out of the car. 
No contraband was visible in the front seat of the Oldsmo-
bile and the rear portion of the roadster was closed. One of 
the agents raised the rumble seat but found no liquor. He 
raised the seat cushion and again found nothing. The officer 
then struck at the "lazyback" of the seat and noticed that it 
was "harder than upholstery ordinarily is in those backs." 
267 U. S., at 174. He tore open the seat cushion and discov-
ered 68 bottles of gin and whiskey concealed inside. No war-
rant had been obtained for the search. 
Carroll and Kiro were convicted of transporting intoxicat-
ing liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act. On 
review of those convictions, this Court ruled that the war-
rantless search of the roadster was reasonable within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In an extensive opinion 
written by Chief Justice Taft, the Court held: 
"On reason and authority the true rule is that if the 
search and seizure without a warrant are made upon 
probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising 
out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an 
automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is 
subject to seizure and destruction, the search and sei-
zure are valid. The Fourth Amendment is to be con-
• On September 29, 1921, Carroll and Kiro met the agents in Grand Rap-
ids and agreed to sell them three cases of whiskey. The sale was not con-
summated, however, possibly because Carroll learned the agents' true 
identity. In October, the agents discovered Carroll and Kiro driving the 
Oldsmobile Roadster on the road to Detroit, which was known as an active 
center for the introduction of illegal liquor into this country. The agents 
followed the roadster as far as East Lansing, but there abandoned the 
chase. 
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strued in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable 
search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner 
which will conserve public interests as well as the inter-
ests and rights of individual citizens." !d., at 149. 
The Court explained at length the basis for this rule. The 
Court noted that historically warrantless searches of vessels, 
wagons, and carriages-as opposed to fixed premises such as 
a home or other building-had been considered reasonable by 
Congress. After reviewing legislation enacted by Congress 
between 1789 and 1799,6 the Court stated: 
"Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 
Fourth Amendment we find in the first Congress, and in 
the following Second and Fourth Congresses, a differ-
ence made as to the necessity for a search warrant be-
tween goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a 
dwelling house or similar place, and like goods in course 
of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel 
where they readily could be put out of reach of a search 
warrant." ld., at 151. 
The Court reviewed additional legislation passed by Con-
gress 7 and again noted that 
"the guaranty' of freedom from unreasonable searches 
and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been con-
strued, practically since the beginning of the Govern-
6 The legislation authorized customs officials to search any ship or vessel 
without a warrant if they had probable cause to believe that it concealed 
goods subject to duty. The same legislation required a warrant for 
searches of dwelling places. 267 U. S., at 150-151. 
' In particular, the Court noted an 1815 statute that permitted customs 
officers not only to board and search vessels without a warrant "but also to 
stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom 
they should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty or 
had been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to 
law." Id., at 151. 
8 
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ment, as recognizing a necessary difference between a 
search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in re-
spect of which a proper official warrant readily may be 
obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or 
automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practi-
cable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be 
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which 
the warrant must be sought." I d., at 153. 
Thus, since its earliest days Congress had recognized the 
impracticability of securing a warrant in cases involving the 
transportation of contraband goods. 8 It is this impractica-
bility, viewed in historical perspective, that provided the 
basis for the Carroll decision. Given the nature of an auto-
mobile in transit, the Court recognized that an immediate in-
trusion is necessary if police officers are to secure the illicit 
substance. In this class of cases, the Court held that a war-
rantless search of an automobile is not unreasonable. 9 
8 In light of this established history, individuals always had been on no-
tice that movable vessels may be stopped and searched on facts giving rise 
to probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband, without the protec-
tion afforded by a magistrate's prior evaluation of those facts. 
9 Subsequent cases make clear that the decision in Carroll was not based 
on the fact that the only course available to the police was an immediate 
search. As Justice Harlan later recognized, although a failure to seize a 
moving automobile believed to contain contraband might deprive officers of 
the illicit goods, once a vehicle itself has been stopped the exigency does 
not necessarily justify a warrantless search. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 
U. S. 42, 62--M (opinion of Harlan, J.). The Court in Chambers, how-
ever-with only Justice Harlan dissenting-refused to adopt a rule that 
would permit a warrantless seizure but prohibit a warrantless search. 
The Court held that if police officers have probable cause to justify a war-
rantless seizure of an automobile on a public roadway, they may conduct an 
immediate search of the contents of that vehicle. "For constitutional pur-
poses, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a 
car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the 
other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given 
probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth 
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In defining the nature of this "exception" to the general 
rule that "[i]n cases where the securing of a warrant is rea-
sonably practicable, it must be used," id., at 156, the Court in 
Carroll emphasized the importance of the requirement that 
officers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle con-
tains contraband. 
"Having thus established that contraband goods con-
cealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other 
vehicle may be searched for without a warrant, we come 
now to consider under what circumstances such search 
may be made. It would be intolerable and unreasonable 
if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every auto-
mobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus subject all 
persons lawfully using the highways to the inconve-
nience and indignity of such a search. Travellers may 
be so stopped in crossing an international boundary be-
cause of national self protection reasonably requiring one 
entering the country to identify himself as entitled to 
Amendment." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S., at 52. 
The Court also has held that if an immediate search on the street is per-
missible without a warrant, a search soon thereafter at the police station is 
permissible if the vehicle is impounded. Chambers, supra; Texas v. 
White, 423 U. S. 67. These decisions are based on the practicalities of the 
situations presented and a realistic appraisal of the relatively minor protec-
tion that a contrary rule would provide for privacy interests. Given the 
scope of the initial intrusion caused by a seizure of an automobile-which 
often could leave the occupants stranded on the highway-the Court re-
jected an inflexible rule that would force police officers in every case either 
to post guard at the vehicle while a warrant is obtained or to tow the vehi-
cle itself to the station. Similarly, if an immediate search on the scene 
could be conducted, but not one at the station if the vehicle is impounded, 
police often simply would search the vehicle on the street-at no advantage 
to the occupants, yet possibly at certain cost to the police. The rules as 
applied in particular cases may appear unsatisfactory. They reflect, how-
ever, a reasoned application of the more general rule that if an individual 
gives the police probable cause to believe a vehicle is transporting contra-
band, he loses the right to proceed on his way without official interference. 
10 
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come in, and his belongings as effects which may be law-
fully brought in. But those lawfully within the country, 
entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free 
passage without interruption or search unless there is 
known to a competent official authorized to search, prob-
able cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying 
contraband or illegal merchandise." Id., at 153-154. 
Moreover, the probable cause determination must be based 
on objective facts that could justify the issuance of a warrant 
by a magistrate and not merely on the subjective good faith 
of the police officers. "'[A]s we have seen, good faith is not 
enough to constitute probable cause. That faith must be 
grounded on facts within knowledge of the [officer], which in 
the judgment of the court would make his faith reasonable.'" 
Id., at 161-162 (quoting Director General v. Kastenbaum, 
263 u. s. 25, 28). 10 
It is also clear that the doctrine of Carroll itself applies 
only to a vehicle stopped "in the course of transportation." 
267 U. S., at 149. Nothing in the opinion in that case sug-
gests that an automobile parked in a private driveway could 
be searched without a warrant, absent other circumstances 
justifying a warrantless search. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U. S. 443.u In short, the exception to the warrant 
requirement established in Carroll-the scope of which we 
10 After reviewing the relevant authorities at some length, the Court con-
cluded that the probable cause requirement was satisfied in the case before 
it. The Court held that "the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were 
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief 
that intoxicating liquor was being transported in the automobile which 
they stopped and searched." /d., at 162. Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 
338 U. S. 160, 176-177; Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 102. 
11 At page 6 of their brief amicus curiae, the Americans for Effective 
Law Enforcement and the International Association of Chiefs of Police also 
state that it is clear that the Carroll exception does not extend to a house 
trailer or camper used for residential purposes. 
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consider in this case-applies only to vehicles stopped in the 
course of transportation and to searches that are supported 
by probable cause. 12 In this class of cases, a search is not un- , 
reasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of 
a warrant, even though a warrant has not actually been 
obtained. 13 
III 
The rationale justifying a warrantless search of an automo-
bile that is believed to be transporting contraband arguably 
applies with equal force to any movable container that is be-
lieved to be carrying an illicit substance. That argument, 
however, was squarely rejected in United States v. Chad-
wick, 433 U. S. 1. 
Chadwick involved the warrantless search of a 200-pound 
12 See Husky v. United States, 282 U. S. 694; Scher v. United States, 305 
U. S. 251; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160; Henry v. United 
States, 361 U. S. 98; Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U. S. 216; Cham-
bers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42; Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67; Colorado v. 
Bannister, 449 U. S. 1. 
Warrantless searches of automobiles have been upheld in a variety of 
factual contexts quite different from that presented in Carroll. Cf. 
Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58; Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433; 
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364. Many of these searches do not 
require a showing of probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband. 
We are not called upon-and do not-consider in this case the scope of the 
warrantless search that is permitted in those cases. 
13 As the Court in Carroll concluded: 
"We here find the line of distinction between legal and illegal seizures of 
liquor in transport in vehicles. It is certainly a reasonable distinction. It 
gives the owner of an automobile or other vehicle seized under Section 26, 
in absence of probable cause, a right to have restored to him the automo-
bile, it protects him under the Weeks and Amos cases from use of the liquor 
as evidence against him, and it subjects the officer making the seizures to 
damages. On the other hand, in a case showing probable cause, the Gov-
ernment and its officials are given the opportunity which they should have, 
to make the investigation necessary to trace reasonably suspected contra-
band goods and to seize them." 267 U. S., at 156. 
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footlocker. Federal railroad officials in San Diego became 
suspicious when they noticed that a brown footlocker loaded 
onto a train bound for Boston was unusually heavy and leak-
ing talcum powder, a substance often used to mask the odor 
of marijuana. Narcotics agents met the train in Boston and 
a trained police dog signaled the presence of a controlled sub-
stance inside the footlocker. While the agents awaited fur-
ther developments, respondent Chadwick arrived and the 
footlocker was placed in the trunk of ~ck's automobile. 
At that point, while the trunk of the c~n and 
before the en ·ne had oeen s arted, the agents seized the 
foot ocker. They later searched the footlocker without a 
warrant and discovered a large quantity of marijuana. 
In a subsequent criminal proceeding, Chadwick claimed 
that the warrantless search of the footlocker violated the 
Fourth Amendment. In the District Court, the Government 
argued that as soon as the footlocker was placed in the auto-
mobile a warrantless search was permissible under Carroll. 
The District Court rejected that argument, 14 and the Govern-
ment did not pursue it on appeal. 15 Rather, the Government 
contended in this Court that the warrant requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment applied only to searches of homes and 
14 The District Court noted: 
"In this case, there was no nexus between the search and the automobile, 
merely a coincidence. The challenged search in this case was one of a foot-
locker, not an automobile. The search took place not in an automobile, but 
in [the federal building]. The only connection that the automobile had to 
this search was that, prior to its seizure, the footlocker was placed on the 
floor of an automobile's open trunk." United States v. Chadwick, 393 F. 
Supp. 763, 772 (Mass. 1975). 
15 This Court specifically noted: "The Government does not contend that 
the footlocker's brief contact with Chadwick's car makes this an automobile 
search, but it is argued that the rationale of our automobile search cases 
demonstrates the reasonableness of permitting warrantless searches of 
luggage; the Government views such luggage as analagous to motor vehi-
cles for Fourth Amendment purposes." 433 U. S., at 11-12. 
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other "core" areas of privacy. The Court unanimously re-
jected that contention. 16 Writing for the Court, THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE stated: 
"[I]f there is little evidence that the Framers intended · 
the Warrant Clause to operate outside the home, there is 
no evidence at all that they intended to exclude from pro-
tection of the Clause all searches occurring outside the 
home. The absence of a contemporary outcry against 
warrantless searches in public places was because, aside 
from searches incident to arrest, such warrantless 
searches were not a large issue in colonial America. 
Thus, silence in the historical record tells us little about 
the Framers' attitude toward application of the Warrant 
Clause to the search of respondents' footlocker. What 
we do know is that the Framers were men who focused 
on the wrongs of that day but who intended the Fourth 
Amendment to safeguard fundamental values which 
would far outlast the specific abuses which gave it 
birth." 433 U. S., at &--9 (footnote omitted). 
The Court ir/i;~adwick}specifically rejected the argument 
that the warrantless search was "reasonable" because a foot-
locker has some of the mobile characteristics that support 
warrantless searches of automobiles. The Court recognized I 
that "a person's expectations of privl!_cy in personal luggage 
are substantially greater than in an automobile," id., at 13, 
and noted that the practical problems associated with the 
temporary detention of a piece of luggage during the period 
of time necessary to obtain a warrant are significantly less 
than those associated with the detention of an automobile. 
!d., at 13, n. 7. In ruling that the warrantless search of the 
footlocker was unjustified, the Court reaffirmed the general 
principle that closed packages and containers may not be 
searched without a warrant. Cf. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 
16 See id., at 17 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). 
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727; United States v. Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249. In sum, the 
Court in Chad wick declined to extend the rationale of the 
"automobile exception" to permit a warrantless search of any 
movable container found in a public place. 17 
The facts in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, w~­
ilar to those in Chadwick. In Sanders, a Little Rock police 
o~ation from a reliable informant that 
Sanders would arrive at the local airport on a specified flight 
that afternoon carrying a green suitcase containing mari-
juana. The officer went to the airport. Sanders arrived on 
schedule and retrieved a green suitcase from the airline bag-
gage service. Sanders gave the suitcase to a waiting com-
panion who placed it in the trunk of a taxi. Sanders and his 
companion drove off in the cab; police officers followed and 
stopped the taxi several blocks from the airport. The offi-
cers opened the trunk, seized the suitcase, and searched it on 
the scene without a warrant. As predicted, the suitcase con-
tained marijuana. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless 
search of the suitcase was impermissible under the Fourth 
Amendment, and this Court affirmed. As in Chadwick, the 
mere fact that the suitcase had been placed rn the trunk of 
the vehicle did not render the automobile exception of Car-
roll applicable; the police had robable cause to seize the suit-
e~ before it was placed in the trun o t e ca and did not 
have probable cause to search the taxi itself. 18 Since the 
17 The Court concluded that there is a significant difference between the 
seizure of a sealed package and a subsequent search of its contents; the 
search of the container in that case was "a far greater intrusion into Fourth 
Amendment values than the impoundment of the footlocker. " I d., at 13, 
n. 8. A temporary seizure of a package or piece of luggage often may be 
accomplished without as significant an intrusion upon the individual-and 
without as great a burden on the police-as in the case of the seizure of an 
automobile. See n. 9, supra. 
18 The Arkansas Supreme Court carefully reviewed the facts of the case 
and concluded: "The information supplied to the police by the confidential 
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suitcase had been placed in the trunk, no danger existed that 
its contents could have been secreted elsewhere in the vehi-
cle. 19 As THE CHIEF JusTICE noted in his opinion concurring 
in the judgment: 
"Because the police officers had probable cause to be-
lieve that respondent's green suitcase contained mari-
juana before it was placed in the trunk of the taxicab, 
their duty to obtain a search warrant before opening it is 
clear under United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 
(1977). 
* * * 
Here, as in Chadwick, it was the luggage being trans-
ported by respondent at the time of the arrest, not the 
automobile in which it was being carried, that was the 
suspected locus of the contraband. The relationship be-
tween the automobile and the contraband was purely co-
incidental, as in Chadwick. The fact that the suitcase 
was resting in the trunk of the automobile at the time of 
respondent's arrest does not turn this into an 'automo-
bile' exception case. The Court need say no more." 
Id., at 76&-767. 
The Court in Sanders did not, however, rest its decision 
solely on the authority of Chadwick. In rejecting the State's 
argument that the warrantless search of the suitcase was jus-
informant [was] adequate to support the State's claim that the police had 
probable cause to believe that appellant's green suitcase contained a con-
trolled substance when the police confiscated the suitcase and opened it." 
262 Ark. 595, 599, 559 S. W. 2d 704, 706 (1977). The court also noted: "The 
evidence in this case supports the conclusion that the relationship between 
the suitcase and the taxicab [was] coincidental." Id. , at 600, n. 2, 559 
S.W. 2d, at 706. 
19 Moreover, none of the practical difficulties associated with the deten-
tion a vehicle on a public highway that made the immediate search in Car-
roll reasonable could justify an immediate search of the suitcase, since the 
officers had no interest in detaining the taxi or its driver. 
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tified on the ground that it had been taken from an automo-
bile lawfully stopped on the street, the Court b~ug- ; 
g~ that a warrantless search of ~,...found in an 7 
automobile could never be sustained as part of a warrantless 
search of the automobile itself. 20 The Court did not suggest 
that it mattered whether probable cause existed to search 
the entire vehicle. It is clear, however, that in neither 
Chadwick nor Sanders did the police have probable cause to 
search the vehicle or anything within it except the footlocker 
in the former case and the green suitcase in the latter. 
Robbins v. California, -- U. S. --, however, was a 
cas~cion was not directed at a specific con-
tainer. In that case the Court for the first time was forced 
to consider whether police officers who are entitled to con-
duct a warrantless search of an automobile stopped on a pub-
lic roadway may open a container found within the vehicle. 
In the early morning of January 5, 1975, police officers 
stopped Robbins' station wagon because he was driving er-
ratically. Robbins got out of the car, but later returned to 
obtain the vehicle's registration papers. When he opened 
the car door, the officers smelled marijuana smoke. One of 
the officers searched Robbins and discovered a vial of liquid; 
in a search of the interior of the car the officer found mari-
juana. The police officers then opened the tailgate of the 
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20 The Court stated that "the extent to which the Fourth Amendment ap- 5 ~ 
plies to containers and other parcels depends not at all upon whether they 
are seized from an automobile." 442 U. S., at 764, n. 13. This general 
rule was limited only by the observation that "[n]ot all containers and pack-
ages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the full pro-
tection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a 
kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any 
reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred 
from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a 
package will be open to 'plain view,' thereby obviating the need for a war-
rant." Ibid. 
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compartment. In the compartment they found two packages 
wrapped in green opaque plastic. The police unwrapped the 
packages and discovered a large amount of marijuana in each. 
Robbins was charged with various drug offenses and 
moved to suppress the contents of the plastic packages. 
The California Court of Appeal held that "[s]earch of the 
automobile was proper when the officers learned that appel-
lant was smoking marijuana when they stopped him,' '21 and 
that the warrantless search of the packages was justified be-
cause "the contents of the packages could have been inferred 
from their outward appearance, so that appellant could not 
have held a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to 
the contents." 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 40, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780, 
783 (1980). 
This Court reversed. Writing for a plurality, Justice 
Stewart rejected the argument that the outward appearance 
of the packages precluded Robbins from having a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their contents. He also squarely 
rejected the argument that there is a constitutional distinc-
tion between searches of luggage and searches of "less wor-
thy" containers. Justice Stewart reasoned that all contain-
ers are equally protected by the Fourth Amendment unless 
their contents are in plain view. The plurality concluded 
that the warrantless search was impermissible because 
Chadwick and Sanders had established that "a closed piece of 
luggage found in a lawfully searched car is constitutionally 
protected to the same extent as are closed pieces of luggage 
found anywhere else." --U.S., at--. 
In a concurring opinion, JUSTICE PowELL, the author of 
the Court's opinion in Sanders, stated that "[t]he plurality's 
approach strains the rationales of our prior cases and imposes 
substantial burdens on law enforcement without vindicating 
any significant values of privacy." /d., at --.22 He noted 
2
' 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 39, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780, 782 (1980). 
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that possibly "the controlling question should be the scope of 
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement," id., at 
--, and explained that under that view 
"when the police have probable cause to search an auto-
mobile, rather than only to search a particular container 
that fortuitously is located in it, the exigencies that allow 
the police to search the entire automobile without a war-
rant support the warrantless search of every container 
found therein. See post, at -- and n. 13 (STEVENS, 
J., dissenting). This analysis is entirely consistent with 
the holdings in Chad'Wick and Sanders, neither of which 
is an 'automobile case,' because the police there had 
probable cause to search the double-locked footlocker 
and the suitcase respectively before either came near an 
automobile." Ibid. 
The parties in Robbins had not pressed that argument, how-
ever, and JUSTICE POWELL concluded that institutional con-
port to protect any privacy interest, it would impose substantial new bur-
dens on law enforcement. Confronted with a cigar box or a Dixie cup in 
the course of a probable cause search of an automobile for narcotics, the 
conscientious policeman would be required to take the object to a magis-
trate, fill out the appropriate forms, await the decision, and finally obtain a 
warrant. Suspects or vehicles normally will be detained while the war-
rant is sought. This process may take hours, removing the officer from his 
normal police duties. Expenditure of such time and effort, drawn from 
the public's limited resources for detecting or preventing crimes, is justi-
fied when it protects an individual's reasonable privacy interests. In my 
view, the plurality's requirement cannot be so justified. The aggregate 
burden of procuring warrants whenever an officer has probable cause to 
search the most trivial container may be heavy and will not be compen-
sated by the advancement of important Fourth Amendment values." --
U. S., at-- (POWELL, J., concurring). 
The substantial burdens on law enforcement identified by JUSTICE Pow-
ELL would, of course, not be affected by the character of the container 
found during an automobile search. No comparable practical problems 
arise when the official suspicion is confined to a particular piece of luggage, 
as in Chadwick and Sanders. Cf. n. 19, supra. 
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straints made it inappropriate to re-examine basic doctrine 
without full adversary presentation. He concurred in the 
judgment, since it was supported-although not compelled-
by the Court's opinion in Sanders, and stated that a future 
case might present a better opportunity for thorough consid-
eration of the basic principles in this troubled area. 
That case has arrived. Unlike Chadwick and Sanders, in 
this case police officers had probable cause to search respond-
ent's entire vehicle. 23 Unlike Robbins, in this case the par-
ties have squarely addressed the question whether, in the 
course of a legitimate warrantless search of an automobile, 
police are entitled to open containers found within the vehi-
cle. We n~stion. Its answer is deter-
mined by the scope of the search that is authorized by the ex-
cep Ion to tlie warrant requirement set forth in Carroll. 
IV 
In Carroll itself, the whiskey that the prohibition agents 
seized was not in plain view. It was discovered only after an 
officer opened the rumble seat and tore open the upholstery 
of the lazyback. The Court did not find the scope of the 
search unreasonable. Having stopped Carroll and Kiro on a 
public road and subjected them to the indignity of a vehicle 
23 The en bane Court of Appeals stated that "[b]ased on the tip the police 
received, Ross's car was properly stopped and searched, and the pouch and 
bag were properly seized." 655 F. 2d, at 1168 (footnote omitted). The 
court explained: 
"[W]e believe it clear that the police had ample and reasonable cause to 
stop Ross and to search his car. The informer had supplied accurate in-
formation on prior occasions, and he was an eyewitness to sales of narcotics 
by Ross. He said he had just seen Ross take narcotics from the trunk of 
his car in making a sale and heard him say he possessed additional narcot-
ics." Id., at 1168, n. 22. 
The court further noted that "[i]n this case, the informant told the police 
that Ross had narcotics in the trunk of his car. No specific container was 
identified." I d., at 1166. 
80-2209-0PINION 
20 UNITED STATES v. ROSS 
search-which the Court found to be a reasonable intrusion 
on their privacy because based on probable cause that their 
vehicle was transporting contraband-prohibition agents 
were entitled to tear open a portion of the roadster itself. 
The scope of the search was no greater than a magistrate 
could have authorized by issuing a warrant based on the 
probable cause that justified the search. Since such a war-
rant could have authorized the agents to open the rear por-
tion of the roadster and to rip the upholstery in their search 
for concealed whiskey, the search was constitutionally 
permissible. 
In Chambers v. Maroney the police found weapons and 
stolen property "concealed in a compartment under the dash-
board." 399 U. S., at 44. No suggestion was made that the 
scope of the search was impermissible. It would be illogical 
to assume that the outcome of Chambers-or the outcome of 
Carroll itself-would have been different if the police had 
found the secreted contraband enclosed within a secondary 
container and had opened that container without a warrant. 
If it was reasonable for prohibition agents to rip open the up-
holstery in Carroll, it certainly would have been reasonable 
for them to look into a burlap sack stashed inside; if it was 
reasonable to open the concealed compartment in Chambers, 
it would have been equally reasonable to open a paper bag 
crumpled within it. A contrary rule could produce absurd 
results inconsistent with the decision in Carroll itself. 
In its application of Carroll, this Court in fact has sus-
tained warrantless searches of containers found during a law-
ful search of an automobile. In Husty v. United States, 282 
U. S. 694, the Court upheld a warrantless seizure of whiskey 
found during a search of an automobile, some of which was 
discovered in "whiskey bags" that could have contained other 
goods. 24 In Scher v. United States, 305 U. S. 251, federal of-
24 At the suppression hearing, defense counsel asked the police officer 
who had conducted the search: "Isn't it possible to put other goods in a bag 
that has the resemblance of a whiskey bag?" The officer responded: "I 
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fleers seized and searched packages of unstamped liquor 
found in the trunk of an automobile searched without a war-
rant. As described by a police officer who participated in 
the search: "I turned the handle and opened the trunk and 
found the trunk completely filled with packages wrapped in 
brown paper, and tied with twine; I think somewhere around 
thirty packages, each one containing six bottles." 25 In these 
cases it was not contended that police officers needed a war-
rant to open the whiskey bags or to unwrap the brown paper 
packages. The fact that no such argument was even made 
illuminates the profession's understanding of the scope of the 
search permitted under Carroll. 26 Indeed, prior to the deci-
sions in Chadwick and Sanders, courts routinely had held 
that containers and packages found during a legitimate war-
rantless search of an automobile also could be searched with-
out a warrant. 'l:1 
suppose it is. I did not think of that at that time. I knew it was whiskey, 
I was sure it was." App., O.T. 1930, No. 477, p. 27. 
25 App., o·.T. 1938, No. 49, p. 33. The brief of then Solicitor General 
Robert Jackson noted that the items searched "were wrapped in very 
heavy brown wrapping paper with at least two wrappings and with a heavy 
cord around them cross-wise so that they could readily be lifted." Brief 
for United States, O.T. 1938, No. 49, p. 6. 
26 It is noteworthy that the early legislation on which the Court relied in 
Carroll concerned the enforcement of laws imposing duties on imported 
merchandise. See nn. 6 and 7, supra. Presumably such merchandise was 
shipped then in containers of various kinds, just as it is today. Since Con-
gress had authorized warrantless searches of vessels and beasts for im-
ported merchandise, it is inconceivable that it intended a customs officer to 
obtain a warrant for every package discovered during the search; certainly 
Congress intended customs officers to open shipping containers when nec-
essary and not merely to examine the exterior of cartons or boxes in which 
smuggled goods might be concealed. During virtually the entire history of 
our country-whether contraband was transported in a horse drawn car-
riage, a 1921 roadster, or a modem automobile-it has been assumed that a 
lawful search of a vehicle would include a search of any container that 
might conceal the object of the search. 
27 See, e. g., United States v. Soriano, 497 F. 2d 147, 149-150 (CA5 1974) 
(en bane); United States v. Vento , 533 F. 2d 838, 867, n. 101 (CA3 1976); 
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As we have stated, the decision in Carroll was based on 
the Court's appraisal of practical considerations viewed in the 
perspective of history. It is therefore significant that the 
practical consequences of the Carroll decision would be 
largely nullified if the permissible scope of a warrantless 
search of an automobile did not include containers and pack-
ages found inside the vehicle. Contraband goods rarely are 
strewn across the trunk or floor of a car; since by their very 
nature such goods must be withheld from public view, they 
rarely can be placed in an automobile unless they are en-
closed within some form of container. The Court in Carroll 
held that "contraband goods concealed and illegally trans-
ported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched for 
without a warrant." 267 U. S., at 153 (emphasis added). 
As we noted in Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 104, the 
decision in Carroll "merely relaxed the requirements for a 
warrant on grounds of impracticability." It neither broad-
ened nor limited the scope of a lawful search based on proba-
ble cause. 
A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the 
entire area in which the object of the search may be found 
and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of en-
try or opening may be required to complete the search. 28 
United States v. Tramunti, 513 F. 2d 1087, 1104 (CA21975); United States 
v. Issod, 508 F. 2d 990, 993 (CA71974); United States v. Evans, 481 F. 2d 
990, 994 (CA9 1973); United States v. Bowman, 487 F. 2d 1229 (CAlO 
1973). Many courts continued to apply this rule following the decision in 
Chadwick. Cf. United States v. Milhollan, 599 F. 2d 518, 52&-527 (CA3 
1979); United States v. Gaultney, 581 F. 2d 1137, 1144-1145 (CA5 1978); 
United States v. Finnegan, 568 F. 2d 637, 640-641 (CA9 1977). In ruling 
that police could search luggage and other containers found during a legiti-
mate warrantless search of an automobile, courts often assumed that the 
"automobile exception" of Carroll applied whenever a container in an auto-
mobile was believed to contain contraband. That view, of course, has 
since been qualified by Chadwick and Sanders. 
28 In describing the permissible scope of a search of a home pursuant to a 
warrant, Professor LaFave notes: 
80-2209-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. ROSS 23 
Thus, a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home 
for illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets, 
chests, drawers, and containers in which the weapon might 
be found. A warrant to open a footlocker to search for mari-
juana would also authorize the opening of packages found in-
side. A warrant to search a vehicle would support a search 
of every part of the vehicle that might contain the object of 
the search. When a legitimate search is under way, and 
when its purpose and its limits have been precisely defined, 
nice distinctions between closets, drawers, and containers, in 
the case of a home, or between glove compartments, uphol-
stered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a 
vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt and effi-
cient completion of the task at hand. 29 
This rule applies equally to all containers, as indeed we be-
lieve it must. One point on which the Court was in virtual 
unanimous agreement in Robbins was that a constitutional 
"Places within the described premises are not excluded merely because 
some additional act of entry or opening may be required. 'In countless 
cases in which warrants described only the land and the buildings, a search 
of desks, cabinets, closets and similar items has been permitted.'" 2 
LaFave, Search and Seizure 152 (1978) (quoting Massey v. Common-
wealth, 305 S. W. 2d 755, 756 (Ky. 1957)). 
29 The practical considerations that justify a warrantless search of an 
automobile continue to apply until the entire search of the automobile and 
its contents has been completed. Arguably, the entire vehicle itself could 
be searched without a warrant, with all containers found during that 
search then taken to a magistrate. Certainly no privacy interest is 
served, however, by prohibiting police from opening immediately a con-
tainer in which the object of the search may most likely be found and in-
stead forcing them first to comb the entire vehicle. Moreover, until the 
container itself was opened the police could never be certain that the con-
traband was not secreted in a yet undiscovered portion of the vehicle; thus 
in every case in which a container was found, the vehicle would need to be 
secured while a warrant was obtained. Such a requirement would be di-
rectly inconsistent with the decisions in Carroll and Chambers. Cf. nn. 19 
and 22, supra. 
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distinction between "worthy'' and "unworthy" containers 
would be improper. 30 Even though such a distinction per-
haps could evolve in a series of cases in which paper bags, 
locked trunks, lunch buckets, and orange crates were placed 
on one side of the line or the other, 31 the central purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment forecloses such a distinction. For 
just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely en-
titled to the same guarantees of privacy as the most majestic 
mansion, 32 so also may a traveler who carries a toothbrush 
and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf 
claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from official in-
spection as the sophisticated executive with the locked 
attache case. 
As Justice Stewart stated in Robbins, the Fourth Amend-
ment provides protection to the owner of eve container 
that concea s s con ens om pam VIew. -- U. S., at 
-- (plurality opinion).But the protection afforded by the 
Amendment varies in different settings. The luggage car-
ried by a traveler entering the country may be searched at 
30 Cf. -- U. S., at -- (plurality opinion); id., at -- (BLACKMUN, J., 
dissenting); id., at-- (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting); id., at-- (STE-
VENS, J., dissenting). 
31 If the distinction is based on the proposition that the Fourth Amend-
ment protects only those containers that objectively manifest an individ-
ual's reasonable expectation of privacy, however, the propriety of a war-
rantless search necessarily would turn on much more than the fabric of the 
contai~ A paper bag stapled shut and marked "private" might be found 
__Jo mliiiifest a reasonable expectation of privacy, as might a cardboard box 
~ stacked on top of two pieces of heavy luggage. The propriety of the war-
- A.,') rantless search seemingly would turn on an objective appraisal of all the 
tY "'": \•... surrounding circumstances. 
32 
" 'The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of 
~ the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow 
t d _e--:- { _.,...,._, through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of En-
l ~ f- . r-vr gland cannot enter-all his forces dares not cross the threshold of the 
lAY rfo/ ruined tenement!'" Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301, 307; cf. 
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random by a customs officer; the luggage may be searched no 
matter how great the traveler's desire to conceal the contents 
may be. A container carried at the time of arrest often may 
be searched without a warrant; the owner's expectation of 
privacy must yield if the police might be endangered or if evi-
dence might be destroyed. A container that may conceal the 
object of a search authorized by a warrant may be opened im-
mediately; the individual's interest in privacy must give way 
to the magistrate's official determination of probable cause. 
In the same manner, an individual's expectation of privacy 
in a vehicle and its contents may not survive if probable cause 
is given to believe that the vehicle is transporting contra-
band. Certainly the privacy interests in a car's trunk or 
glove compartment may be no less than those in a movable 
container; an individual undoubtedly has a significant interest 
that the upholstery of his automobile will not be ripped or a 
hidden compartment within it opened. These interests must 
yield to the authority of a search, however, which-in light of 
Carrollr-does not itself require the prior approval of a mag-
istrate. The scope of a warrantless search based on proba-
ble cause is no narrower-and no broader-than the scope of 
a search authorized by a warrant supported by probable 
cause. Only the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; 
the search otherwise is as the magistrate could authorize. \ 
The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is 
not defined by the nature of the container in which the con-
traband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of 
the search and the places in which there is probable cause to 
believe that it may be found. Just as probable cause to be-
lieve that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will 
not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, proba-
ble cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being 
transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a 
suitcase. Probable cause to believe that a container placed 
in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband does not justify a 
search of the entire cab. 
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v 
Our decision today is inconsistent with the disposition in 
Robbins v. California and with s~Ar­
kansas v. Sanders. Nevertheless, the doctrine of stare deci-
sis~clude this action. Although we have rejected 
some of the reasoning in Sanders, we adhere to our holding in 
that case; moreover, although we reject the precise holding 
in Robbins, there was no Court opinion supporting a single 
rationale for its judgment and the reasoning we adopt today 
was not presented by the parties in that case. Furthermore, 
we reaffirm the plurality's rejection of a constitutional dis-
tinction between worthy and unworthy containers. More-
over, it is clear that no legitimate reliance interest can be 
frustrated by our decision today. Of greatest importance, 
we are convinced that the rule we apply in this case is faithful 
to the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that the 
Court has followed with substantial consistency throughout 
our history. 
We reaffirm the basic rule of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence stated by Justice Stewart for a unanimous Court in 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390: 
"The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable 
searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that 
'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without 
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a 
few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions.' Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (foot-
notes omitted)." 
The exception recognized in Carroll is unquestionably one 
that is "specifically established and well-delineated." We 
hold that the scope of the warrantless search authorized by 
that exception is no broader and no narrower than a magis-
trate could legitimately authorize by warrant. If probable 
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cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it jus-
tifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents 
that may conceal the object of the search. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
,§u:prtmt C!fou.rt of tqt ~ili~ j;htua 
'lUa:sJrington, !J. <!f. 2!1,51!;1 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
May 6, 1982 
Re: No. 80-2209 - United States v. Ross 
Dear John: 
"In due course" I shall circulate a dissent. 
Justice Stevens 





CHAM BERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.§u:p-rtnu <!J•tttrlltf Hrt %riftb .§hrltg 
ji rul fringlo14 ~. <!f. 21lp'!.;l 
May 7, 1982 
Re: No. 81-2209 United States v. Ross 
Dear John, 
Subject to the making of the minor changes we have 




cc: The Conference 
f ! 
( 
To: The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan 






From: Justice Stevens 
Circulated: ________ _ 
2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-2209 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ALBERT ROSS, JR. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1982] 
JusTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, the Court held 
that a warrantless search of an automobile stopped by police 
officers who had probable cause to believe the vehicle con-
tained contraband was not unreasonable within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment. The Court in Carroll did not ex-
plicitly address the scope of the search that is permissible. 
In this case, we consider the extent to which police officers-
who have legitimately stopped an automobile and who have C:: 
probable cause to believe that contraband is concealed some- ;; L-e-
where within it-may conduct a probing search of compart-
ments and containers within the vehicle whose contents are /J .J /~- , 
not in plain view. We hold that they may conduct a search of ~
the vehicle that is as thorough as a magistrate could autho-
rize in a warrant "particularly describing the place to be /-o ~ 
searched." 1 
I <j ~ 
In the evening of November 27, 1978, an informant who 
had previously proved to be reliable telephoned Detective~, 
'"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
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Marcum of the District of Columbia Police Department and 
told him that an individual known as "Bandit" was selling 
narcotics kept in the trunk of a car parked at 439 Ridge 
Street. The informant stated that he had just observed 
"Bandit" complete a sale and that "Bandit" had told him that 
additional narcotics were in the trunk. The informant gave 
Marcum a detailed description of "Bandit" and stated that the 
car was a "purplish maroon" Chevrolet Malibu with District 
of Columbia license plates. 
Accompanied by Detective Cassidy and Sergeant Gon-
zales, Marcum immediately drove to the area and found a ma-
roon Malibu parked in front of 439 Ridge Street. A license 
check disclosed that the car was registered to Albert Ross; a 
computer check on Ross revealed that he fit the informant's 
description and used the alias "Bandit." In two passes 
through the neighborhood the officers did not observe anyone 
matching the informant's description. To avoid alerting per-
sons on the street, they left the area. 
The officers returned five minutes later and observed the 
maroon Malibu turning off Ridge Street onto Fourth Street. 
They pulled alongside the Malibu, noticed that the driver 
matched the informant's description, and stopped the car. 
Marcum and Cassidy told the driver-later identified as Al-
bert Ross, the respondent in this action-to get out of the ve-
hicle. While they searched Ross, Sergeant Gonzales discov-
ered a bullet on the car's front seat. He searched the 
interior of the car and found a pistol in the glove compart-
ment. Ross then was arrested and handcuffed. Detective 
Cassidy took Ross' keys and opened the trunk, where he 
found a closed brown paper bag. He opened the bag and dis-
covered a number of glassine bags containing a white pow-
der. Cassidy replaced the bag, closed the trunk, and drove 
the car to Headquarters. 
At the police station Cassidy thoroughly searched the car. 
In addition to the "lunch-type" brown paper bag, Cassidy 
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zipped the pouch and discovered $3,200 in cash. The police 
laboratory later determined that the powder in the paper bag 
was heroin. No warrant was obtained. 
Ross was charged with possession of heroin with intent to 
distribute, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841(a). Prior to trial, 
he moved to suppress the heroin found in the paper bag and 
the currency found in the leather pouch. After an eviden-
tiary hearing, the District Court denied the motion to sup-
press. The heroin and currency were introduced in evidence 
at trial and Ross was convicted. 
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the 
conviction. It held that the police had probable cause to stop 
and search Ross' car and that, under Carroll v. United 
States, supra, and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, the 
officers lawfully could search the automobile-including its 
trunk-without a warrant. The court considered sepa-
rately, however, the warrantless search of the two containers 
found in the trunk. On the basis of Arkansas v. Sanders, 
442 U. S. 753, the court concluded that the constitutionality 
of a warrantless search of a container found in an automobile 
depends on whether the owner possesses a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in its contents. Applying that test, the 
court held that the warrantless search of the paper bag was 
valid but the search of the leather pouch was not. The court 
remanded for a new trial at which the items taken from the 
paper bag, but not those from the leather pouch, could be 
admitted. 2 
The entire Court of Appeals then voted to rehear the case 
en bane. A majority of the court rejected the panel's conclu-
sion that a distinction of constitutional significance existed 
between the two containers found in respondent's trunk; it 
2 The court rejected the Government's argument that the warrantless 
search of the leather pouch was justified as incident to respondent's arrest. 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 137a. The Government has not challenged this 
holding. 
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held that the police should not have opened either container 
without first obtaining a warrant. The court reasoned: 
"No specific, well-delineated exception called to our 
attention permits the police to dispense with a warrant 
to open and search 'unworthy' containers. Moreover, 
we believe that a rule under which the validity of a war-
rantless search would turn on judgments about the dura-
bility of a container would impose an unreasonable and 
unmanageable burden on police and courts. For these 
reasons, and because the Fourth Amendment protects 
all persons, not just those with the resources or fastidi-
ousness to place their effects in containers that decision-
makers would rank in the luggage line, we hold that the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement forbids the 
warrantless opening of a closed, opaque paper bag to the 
same extent that it forbids the warrantless opening of a 
small unlocked suitcase or a zippered leather pouch." 
655 F. 2d 1159, 1161 (CADC 1981) (footnote omitted). 
The en bane Court of Appeals considered, and rejected, the 
argument that it was reasonable for the police to open both 
the paper bag and the leather pouch because they were enti-
tled to conduct a warrantless search of the entire vehicle in 
which the two containers were found. The majority con-
cluded that this argument was foreclosed by Sanders. 
Three dissenting judges interpreted Sanders differently. 3 
Other courts also have read the Sanders opinion in different 
3 Judge Tamm, the author of the original panel opinion, reiterated the 
view that Sanders prohibited the warrantless search of the leather pouch 
but not the search of the paper bag. Judge Robb agreed that this result 
was compelled by Sanders, although he stated that in his opinion "the right 
to search an automobile should include the right to open any container 
found within the automobile, just as the right to search a lawfully arrested 
prisoner carries with it the right to examine the contents of his wallet and 
any envelope found in his pocket, and the right to search a room includes 
authority to open and search all the drawers and containers found within 
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ways. 4 Moreover, disagreement concerning the proper in-
terpretation of Sanders was at least partially responsible for 
the fact that Robbins v. California,-- U. S. --,was de-
cided last Term without a Court opinion. 
There is, however, no dispute among judges about the im-
portance of striving for clarification in this area of the law. 
For countless vehicles are stopped on highways and public 
streets every day and our cases demonstrate that it is not un-
common for police officers to have probable cause to believe 
that contraband may be found in a stopped vehicle. In every 
such case a conflict is presented between the individual's con-
stitutionally protected interest in privacy and the public in-
terest in effective law enforcement. No single rule of law 
can resolve every conflict, but our conviction that clarifica-
tion is feasible led us to grant the Government's petition for 
certiorari in this case and to invite the parties to address the 
question whether the decision in Robbins should be reconsid-
ered. -- U. S. --. 
II 
We begin with a review of the decision in Carroll itself. 
In the fall of 1921, federal prohibition agents obtained evi-
dence that George Carroll and John Kiro were "bootleggers" 
who frequently traveled between Grand Rapids and Detroit 
the room." 655 F. 2d, at 1180. Judge MacKinnon concurred with Judge 
Tamm that Sanders did not prohibit the warrantless search of the paper 
bag. Concerning the leather pouch, he agreed with Judge Wilkey, who 
dissented on the ground that Sanders should not be applied retroactively. 
'Many courts have held that Sanders requires that a warrant be ob-
tained only for personal luggage and other "luggage-type" containers. 
See, e. g., United States v. Goshorn, 628 F. 2d 697 (CAl 1980); United 
States v. Brown, 635 F. 2d 1207 (CA6 1980); United States v. Jiminez, 626 
F . 2d 39 (CA71980). One court has held that Sanders does not apply if the 
police have probable cause to search an entire vehicle and not merely an 
isolated container within it. Cf. State v. Bible, 389 So. 2d 42 (La. 1980), 
remanded,- U.S.-; State v. Hernandez, 408 So. 2d 911 (La. 1981); 
see also United States v. Ross, 655 F . 2d, at 1180 (Robb, J., dissenting). 
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in an Oldsmobile Roadster. 5 On December 15, 1921, the 
agents unexpectedly encountered Carroll and Kiro driving 
west on that route in that car. The officers gave pursuit, 
stopped the roadster on the highway, and directed Carroll 
and Kiro to get out of the car. 
No contraband was visible in the front seat of the Oldsmo-
bile and the rear portion of the roadster was closed. One of 
the agents raised the rumble seat but found no liquor. He 
raised the seat cushion and again found nothing. The officer 
then struck at the "lazyback" of the seat and noticed that it 
was "harder than upholstery ordinarily is in those backs." 
267 U. S., at 174. He tore open the seat cushion and discov-
ered 68 bottles of gin and whiskey concealed inside. No war-
rant had been obtained for the search. 
Carroll and Kiro were convicted of transporting intoxicat-
ing liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act. On 
review of those convictions, this Court ruled that the war-
rantless search of the roadster was reasonable within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In an extensive opinion 
written by Chief Justice Taft, the Court held: 
"On reason and authority the true rule is that if the 
search and seizure without a warrant are made upon 
probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising 
out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an 
automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is 
subject to seizure and destruction, the search and sei-
zure are valid. The Fourth Amendment is to be con-
5 On September 29, 1921, Carroll and Kiro met the agents in Grand Rap-
ids and agreed to sell them three cases of whiskey. The sale was not con-
summated, however, possibly because Carroll learned the agents' true 
identity. In October, the agents discovered Carroll and Kiro driving the 
Oldsmobile Roadster on the road to Detroit, which was known as an active 
center for the introduction of illegal liquor into this country. The agents 
followed the roadster as far as East Lansing, but there abandoned the 
chase. 
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strued in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable 
search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner 
which will conserve public interests as well as the inter-
ests and rights of individual citizens." I d., at 149. 
The Court explained at length the basis for this rule. The 
Court noted that historically warrantless searches of vessels, 
wagons, and carriages-as opposed to fixed premises such as 
a home or other building-had been considered reasonable by 
Congress. Mter reviewing legislation enacted by Congress 
between 1789 and 1799,6 the Court stated: 
"Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 
Fourth Amendment we find in the first Congress, and in 
the following Second and Fourth Congresses, a differ-
ence made as to the necessity for a search warrant be-
tween goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a 
dwelling house or similar place, and like goods in course 
of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel 
where they readily could be put out of reach of a search 
warrant." ld., at 151. 
The Court reviewed additional legislation passed by Con-
gress 7 and again noted that 
"the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches 
and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been con-
strued, practically since the beginning of the Govern-
' The legislation authorized customs officials to search any ship or vessel 
without a warrant if they had probable cause to believe that it concealed 
goods subject to duty. The same legislation required a warrant for 
searches of dwelling places. 267 U. S. , at 150--151. 
7 In particular, the Court noted an 1815 statute that permitted customs 
officers not only to board and search vessels without a warrant "but also to 
stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom 
they should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty or 
had been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to 
law." Id., at 151. 
8 
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ment, as recognizing a necessary difference between a 
search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in re-
spect of which a proper official warrant readily may be 
obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or 
automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practi-
cable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be 
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which 
the warrant must be sought." I d., at 153. 
Thus, since its earliest days Congress had recognized the 
impracticability of securing a warrant in cases involving the 
transportation of contraband goods. 8 It is this impractica-
bility, viewed in historical perspective, that provided the 
basis for the Carroll decision. Given the nature of an auto-
mobile in transit, the Court recognized that an immediate in-
trusion is necessary if police officers are to secure the illicit 
substance. In this class of cases, the Court held that a war-
rantless search of an automobile is not unreasonable. 9 
8 In light of this established history, individuals always had been on no-
tice that movable vessels may be stopped and searched on facts giving rise 
to probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband, without the protec-
tion afforded by a magistrate's prior evaluation of those facts. 
9 Subsequent cases make clear that the decision in Carroll was not based 
on the fact that the only course available to the police was an immediate 
search. As Justice Harlan later recognized, although a failure to seize a 
moving automobile believed to contain contraband might deprive officers of 
the illicit goods, once a vehicle itself has been stopped the exigency does 
not necessarily justify a warrantless search. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 
U. S. 42, 62-64 (opinion of Harlan, J.). The Court in Chambers, how-
ever-with only Justice Harlan dissenting-refused to adopt a rule that 
would permit a warrantless seizure but prohibit a warrantless search. 
The Court held that if police officers have probable cause to justify a war-
rantless seizure of an automobile on a public roadway, they may conduct an 
immediate search of the contents of that vehicle. "For constitutional pur-
poses, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a 
car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the 
other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given 
probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth 
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In defining the nature of this "exception" to the general 
rule that "[i]n cases where the securing of a warrant is rea-
sonably practicable, it must be used," id., at 156, the Court in 
Carroll emphasized the importance of the requirement that 
officers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle con-
tains contraband. 
"Having thus established that contraband goods con-
cealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other 
vehicle may be searched for without a warrant, we come 
now to consider under what circumstances such search 
may be made. It would be intolerable and unreasonable 
if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every auto-
mobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus subject all 
persons lawfully using the highways to the inconve-
nience and indignity of such a search. Travellers may 
be so stopped in crossing an international boundary be-
cause of national self protection reasonably requiring one 
entering the country to identify himself as entitled to 
Amendment." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S., at 52. 
The Court also has held that if an immediate search on the street is per-
missible without a warrant, a search soon thereafter at the police station is 
permissible if the vehicle is impounded. Chambers, supra; Texas v. 
White, 423 U. S. 67. These decisions are based on the practicalities of the 
situations presented and a realistic appraisal of the relatively minor protec-
tion that a contrary rule would provide for privacy interests. Given the 
scope of the initial intrusion caused by a seizure of an automobile-which 
often could leave the occupants stranded on the highway-the Court re-
jected an inflexible rule that would force police officers in every case either 
to post guard at the vehicle while a warrant is obtained or to tow the vehi-
cle itself to the station. Similarly, if an immediate search on the scene 
could be conducted, but not one at the station if the vehicle is impounded, 
police often simply would search the vehicle on the street-at no advantage 
to the occupants, yet possibly at certain cost to the police. The rules as 
applied in particular cases may appear unsatisfactory. They reflect, how-
ever, a reasoned application of the more general rule that if an individual 
gives the police probable cause to believe a vehicle is transporting contra-
band, he loses the right to proceed on his way without official interference. 
10 
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come in, and his belongings as effects which may be law-
fully brought in. But those lawfully within the country, 
entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free 
passage without interruption or search unless there is 
known to a competent official authorized to search, prob-
able cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying 
contraband or illegal merchandise." !d., at 153--154. 
Moreover, the probable cause determination must be based 
on objective facts that could justify the issuance of a warrant 
by a magistrate and not merely on the subjective good faith 
of the police officers. "'[A]s we have seen, good faith is not 
enough to constitute probable cause. That faith must be 
grounded on facts within knowledge of the [officer], which in 
the judgment of the court would make his faith reasonable.'" 
!d., at 161-162 (quoting Director General v. Kastenbaum, 
263 u. s. 25, 28). 10 
The Court in Carroll also emphasized that the vehicle had l 
been stopped "in the course of transportation." 267 U. S., 
at 149. Nothing in the opinion in that case suggests that an 
automobile parked in a private driveway could be searched 
without a warrant, absent other circumstances justifying a 
warrantless search. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U. S. 443. 11 In short, the exception to the warrant require-
ment established in Carroll-the scope of which we consider 
in this case-applies only to vehicles ~topped ~ the public 1 
10 After reviewing the relevant authorities at some length, the Court con-
cluded that the probable cause requirement was satisfied in the case before 
it. The Court held that "the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were 
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief 
that intoxicating liquor was being transported in the automobile which 
they stopped and searched." !d., at 162. Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 
338 U. S. 160, 17~177; Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102. 
"At page 6 of their brief amicus curiae, the Americans for Effective 
Law Enforcement and the International Association of Chiefs of Police also 
state that it is clear that the Carroll exception does not extend to a house 
trailer or camper used for residential purposes. 
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highways and to searches that are supported by probable ~ 
cause. 12 In this class of cases, a search is not unreasonable if 
based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, 
even though a warrant has not actually been obtained. 13 
III 
The rationale justifying a warrantless search of an automo-
bile that is believed to be transporting contraband arguably 
applies with equal force to any movable container that is be-
lieved to be carrying an illicit substance. That argument, 
however, was squarely rejected in United States v. Chad-
wick, 433 U. S. 1. 
Chadwick involved the warrantless search of a 200-pound 
footlocker. Federal railroad officials in San Diego became 
suspicious when they noticed that a brown footlocker loaded 
12 See Husky v. United States, 282 U. S. 694; Scher v. United States, 305 
U. S. 251; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160; Henry v. United 
States, 361 U. S. 98; Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U. S. 216; Cham-
bers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42; Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67; Colorado v. 
Bannister, 449 U. S. 1. 
Warrantless searches of automobiles have been upheld in a variety of 
factual contexts quite different from that presented in Carroll. Cf. 
Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58; Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433; 
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364. Many of these searches do not 
require a showing of probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband. 
We are not called upon-and do not-consider in this case the scope of the 
warrantless search that is permitted in those cases. 
13 As the Court in Carroll concluded: 
"We here find the line of distinction between legal and illegal seizures of 
liquor in transport in vehicles. It is certainly a reasonable distinction. It 
gives the owner of an automobile or other vehicle seized under Section 26, 
in absence of probable cause, a right to have restored to him the automo-
bile, it protects him under the Weeks and Amos cases from use of the liquor 
as evidence against him, and it subjects the officer making the seizures to 
damages. On the other hand, in a case showing probable cause, the Gov-
ernment and its officials are given the opportunity which they should have, 
to make the investigation necessary to trace reasonably suspected contra-
band goods and to seize them." 267 U. S., at 156. 
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onto a train bound for Boston was unusually heavy and leak-
ing talcum powder, a substance often used to mask the odor 
of marijuana. Narcotics agents met the train in Boston and 
a trained police dog signaled the presence of a controlled sub-
stance inside the footlocker. While the agents awaited fur-
ther developments, respondent Chadwick arrived and the 
footlocker was placed in the trunk of Chadwick's automobile. 
At that point, while the trunk of the car was still open and 
before the engine had been started, the agents seized the 
footlocker. They later searched the footlocker without a 
warrant and discovered a large quantity of marijuana. 
In a subsequent criminal proceeding, Chadwick claimed 
that the warrantless search of the footlocker violated the 
Fourth Amendment. In the District Court, the Government 
argued that as soon as the footlocker was placed in the auto-
mobile a warrantless search was permissible under Carroll. 
The District Court rejected that argument, 14 and the Govern-
ment did not pursue it on appeal. 15 Rather, the Government 
contended in this Court that the warrant requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment applied only to searches of homes and 
other "core" areas of privacy. The Court unanimously re-
jected that contention. 16 Writing for the Court, THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE stated: 
"The District Court noted: 
"In this case, there was no nexus between the search and the automobile, 
merely a coincidence. The challenged search in this case was one of a foot-
locker, not an automobile. The search took place not in an automobile, but 
in [the federal building]. The only connection that the automobile had to 
this search was that, prior to its seizure, the footlocker was placed on the 
floor of an automobile's open trunk." United States v. Chadwick, 393 F. 
Supp. 763, 772 (Mass. 1975). 
15 This Court specifically noted: "The Government does not contend that 
the footlocker's brief contact with Chadwick's car makes this an automobile 
search, but it is argued that the rationale of our automobile search cases 
demonstrates the reasonableness of permitting warrantless searches of 
luggage; the Government views such luggage as analagous to motor vehi-
cles for Fourth Amendment purposes." 433 U. S., at 11-12. 
'"See id., at 17 (BLACKMUN, J . , dissenting). 
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"[I]f there is little evidence that the Framers intended 
the Warrant Clause to operate outside the home, there is 
no evidence at all that they intended to exclude from pro-
tection of the Clause all searches occurring outside the 
home. The absence of a contemporary outcry against 
warrantless searches in public places was because, aside 
from searches incident to arrest, such warrantless 
searches were not a large issue in colonial America. 
Thus, silence in the historical record tells us little about 
the Framers' attitude toward application of the Warrant 
Clause to the search of respondents' footlocker. What 
we do know is that the Framers were men who focused 
on the wrongs of that day but who intended the Fourth 
Amendment to safeguard fundamental values which 
would far outlast the specific abuses which gave it 
birth." 433 U. 8., at 8-9 (footnote omitted). 
The Court in Chadwick specifically rejected the argument 
that the warrantless search was "reasonable" because a foot-
locker has some of the mobile characteristics that support 
warrantless searches of automobiles. The Court recognized 
that "a person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage 
are substantially greater than in an automobile," id., at 13, 
and noted that the practical problems associated with the 
temporary detention of a piece of luggage during the period 
of time necessary to obtain a warrant are significantly less 
than those associated with the detention of an automobile. 
!d., at 13, n. 7. In ruling that the warrantless search of the 
footlocker was unjustified, the Court reaffirmed the general 
principle that closed packages and containers may not be 
searched without a warrant. Cf. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 
727; United States v. Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249. In sum, the 
Court in Chad wick declined to extend the rationale of the 
"automobile exception" to permit a warrantless search of any 
movable container found in a public place. 17 
17 The Court concluded that there is a significant difference between the 
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The facts in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, were sim-
ilar to those in Chadwick. In Sanders, a Little Rock police 
officer received information from a reliable informant that 
Sanders would arrive at the local airport on a specified flight 
that afternoon carrying a green suitcase containing mari-
juana. The officer went to the airport. Sanders arrived on 
schedule and retrieved a green suitcase from the airline bag-
gage service. Sanders gave the suitcase to a waiting com-
panion who placed it in the trunk of a taxi. Sanders and his 
companion drove off in the cab; police officers followed and 
stopped the taxi several blocks from the airport. The offi-
cers opened the trunk, seized the suitcase, and searched it on 
the scene without a warrant. As predicted, the suitcase con-
tained marijuana. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless 
search of the suitcase was impermissible under the Fourth 
Amendment, and this Court affirmed. As in Chadwick, the 
mere fact that the suitcase had been placed in the trunk of 
the vehicle did not render the automobile exception of Car-
roll applicable; the police had probable cause to seize the suit-
case before it was placed in the trunk of the cab and did not 
have probable cause to search the taxi itself. 18 Since the 
seizure of a sealed package and a subsequent search of its contents; the 
search of the container in that case was "a far greater intrusion into Fourth 
Amendment values than the impoundment of the footlocker." Id., at 13, 
n. 8. A temporary seizure of a package or piece of luggage often may be 
accomplished without as significant an intrusion upon the individual-and 
without as great a burden on the police-as in the case of the seizure of an 
automobile. Seen. 9, supra. 
'" The Arkansas Supreme Court carefully reviewed the facts of the case 
and concluded: "The information supplied to the police by the confidential 
informant is adequate to support the State's claim that the police had prob-
able cause to believe that appellant's green suitcase contained a controlled 
substance when the police confiscated the suitcase and opened it." 262 
Ark. 595, 599, 559 S.W. 2d 704, 706 (1977). The court also noted: "The 
evidence in this case supports the conclusion that the relationship between 
the suitcase and the taxicab is coincidental." Id., at 600, n. 2, 559 S.W. 
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suitcase had been placed in the trunk, no danger existed that 
its contents could have been secreted elsewhere in the vehi-
cle. 19 As THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted in his opinion concurring 
in the judgment: 
"Because the police officers had probable cause to be-
lieve that respondent's green suitcase contained mari-
juana before it was placed in the trunk of the taxicab, 
their duty to obtain a search warrant before opening it is 
clear under United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 
(1977). 
* * * 
Here, as in Chadwick, it was the luggage being trans-
ported by respondent at the time of the arrest, not the 
automobile in which it was being carried, that was the 
suspected locus of the contraband. The relationship be-
tween the automobile and the contraband was purely co-
incidental, as in Chadwick. The fact that the suitcase 
was resting in the trunk of the automobile at the time of 
respondent's arrest does not turn this into an 'automo-
bile' exception case. The Court need say no more." 
ld., at 76&-767. 
The Court in Sanders did not, however, rest its decision 
solely on the authority of Chadwick. In rejecting the State's 
argument that the warrantless search of the suitcase was jus-
tified on the ground that it had been taken from an automo-
bile lawfully stopped on the street, the Court broadly sug-
gested that a warrantless search of a container found in an 
automobile could never be sustained as part of a warrantless 
search of the automobile itself. 20 The Court did not suggest 
2d, at 706. 
19 Moreover, none of the practical difficulties associated with the deten-
tion of a vehicle on a public highway that made the immediate search in 
Carroll reasonable could justify an immediate search of the suitcase, since 
the officers had no interest in detaining the taxi or its driver. 
21) The Court stated that "the extent to which the Fourth Amendment ap-
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that it mattered whether probable cause existed to search 
the entire vehicle. It is clear, however, that in neither 
Chadwick nor Sanders did the police have probable cause to 
search the vehicle or anything within it except the footlocker 
in the former case and the green suitcase in the latter. 
Robbins v. California, --U.S. --, however, was a 
case in which suspicion was not directed at a specific con-
tainer. In that case the Court for the first time was forced 
to consider whether police officers who are entitled to con-
duct a warrantless search of an automobile stopped on a pub-
lic roadway may open a container found within the vehicle. 
In the early morning of January 5, 1975, police officers 
stopped Robbins' station wagon because he was driving er-
ratically. Robbins got out of the car, but later returned to 
obtain the vehicle's registration papers. When he opened 
the car door, the officers smelled marijuana smoke. One of 
the officers searched Robbins and discovered a vial of liquid; 
in a search of the interior of the car the officer found mari-
juana. The police officers then opened the tailgate of the 
station wagon and raised the cover of a recessed luggage 
compartment. In the compartment they found two packages 
wrapped in green opaque plastic. The police unwrapped the 
packages and discovered a large amount of marijuana in each. 
Robbins was charged with various drug offenses and 
moved to suppress the contents of the plastic packages. 
The California Court of Appeal held that "[s]earch of the 
plies to containers and other parcels depends not at all upon whether they 
are seized from an automobile." 442 U. S. , at 764, n. 13. This general 
rule was limited only by the observation that "[n]ot all containers and pack-
ages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the full pro-
tection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a 
kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any 
reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred 
from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a 
package will be open to 'plain view,' thereby obviating the need for a war-
rant." Ibid. 
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automobile was proper when the officers learned that appel-
lant was smoking marijuana when they stopped him" 21 and 
that the warrantless search of the packages was justified be-
cause "the contents of the packages could have been inferred 
from their outward appearance, so that appellant could not 
have held a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to 
the contents." 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 40, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780, 
783 (1980). 
This Court reversed. Writing for a plurality, Justice 
Stewart rejected the argument that the outward appearance 
of the packages precluded Robbins from having a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their contents. He also squarely 
rejected the argument that there is a constitutional distinc-
tion between searches of luggage and searches of "less wor-
thy" containers. Justice Stewart reasoned that all contain-
ers are equally protected by the Fourth Amendment unless 
their contents are in plain view. The plurality concluded 
that the warrantless search was impermissible because 
Chadwick and Sanders had established that "a closed piece of 
luggage found in a lawfully searched car is constitutionally 
protected to the same extent as are closed pieces of luggage 
found anywhere else." -- U. S., at--. 
In a concurring opinion, JUSTICE POWELL, the author of 
the Court's opinion in Sanders, stated that "[t]he plurality's 
approach strains the rationales of our prior cases and imposes 
substantial burdens on law enforcement without vindicating 
any significant values of privacy." I d., at --.22 He noted 
2
' 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 39, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780, 782 (1980). 
22 "While the plurality's blanket warrant requirement does not even pur-
port to protect any privacy interest, it would impose substantial new bur-
dens on law enforcement. Confronted with a cigar box or a Dixie cup in 
the course of a probable cause search of an automobile for narcotics, the 
conscientious policeman would be required to take the object to a magis-
trate, fill out the appropriate forms, await the decision, and finally obtain a 
warrant. Suspects or vehicles normally will be detained while the war-
rant is sought. This process may take hours, removing the officer from his 
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that possibly "the controlling question should be the scope of 
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement," id., at 
--, and explained that under that view 
"when the police have probable cause to search an auto-
mobile, rather than only to search a particular container 
that fortuitously is located in it, the exigencies that allow 
the police to search the entire automobile without a war-
rant support the warrantless search of every container 
found therein. See post, at -- and n. 13 (STEVENS, 
J., dissenting). This analysis is entirely consistent with 
the holdings in Chadwick and Sanders, neither of which 
is an 'automobile case,' because the police there had 
probable cause to search the double-locked footlocker 
and the suitcase respectively before either came near an 
automobile." Ibid. 
The parties in Robbins had not pressed that argument, how-
ever, and JUSTICE POWELL concluded that institutional con-
straints made it inappropriate to re-examine basic doctrine 
without full adversary presentation. He concurred in the 
judgment, since it was supported-although not compelled-
by the Court's opinion in Sanders, and stated that a future 
case might present a better opportunity for thorough consid-
eration of the basic principles in this troubled area. 
normal police duties. Expenditure of such time and effort, drawn from 
the public's limited resources for detecting or preventing crimes, is justi-
fied when it protects an individual's reasonable privacy interests. In my 
view, the plurality's requirement cannot be so justified. The aggregate 
burden of procuring warrants whenever an officer has probable cause to 
search the most trivial container may be heavy and will not be compen-
sated by the advancement of important Fourth Amendment values." --
U. S., at-- (POWELL, J., concurring). 
The substantial burdens on law enforcement identified by JUSTICE Pow-
ELL would, of course, not be affected by the character of the container 
found during an automobile search. No comparable practical problems 
arise when the official suspicion is confined to a particular piece of luggage, 
as in Chadwick and Sanders. Cf. n. 19, supra. 
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That case has arrived. Unlike Chadwick and Sanders, in 
this case police officers had probable cause to search respond-
ent's entire vehicle. 23 Unlike Robbins, in this case the par-
ties have squarely addressed the question whether, in the 
course of a legitimate warrantless search of an automobile, 
police are entitled to open containers found within the vehi-
cle. We now address that question. Its answer is deter-
mined by the scope of the search that is authorized by the ex-
ception to the warrant requirement set forth in Carroll. 
IV 
In Carroll itself, the whiskey that the prohibition agents 
seized was not in plain view. It was discovered only after an 
officer opened the rumble seat and tore open the upholstery 
of the lazyback. The Court did not find the scope of the 
search unreasonable. Having stopped Carroll and Kiro on a 
public road and subjected them to the indignity of a vehicle 
search-which the Court found to be a reasonable intrusion 
on their privacy because it was based on probable cause that 
their vehicle was transporting contraband-prohibition 
agents were entitled to tear open a portion of the roadster 
itself. The scope of the search was no greater than a magis-
trate could have authorized by issuing a warrant based on the 
23 The en bane Court of Appeals stated that "[b ]ased on the tip the police 
received, Ross's car was properly stopped and searched, and the pouch and 
bag were properly seized." 655 F. 2d, at 1168 (footnote omitted). The 
court explained: 
"[W]e believe it clear that the police had ample and reasonable cause to 
stop Ross and to search his car. The informer had supplied accurate in-
formation on prior occasions, and he was an eyewitness to sales of narcotics 
by Ross. He said he had just seen Ross take narcotics from the trunk of 
his car in making a sale and heard him say he possessed additional narcot-
ics." /d., at 1168, n. 22. 
The court further noted that "[i]n this case, the informant told the police 
that Ross had narcotics in the trunk of his car. No specific container was 
identified." /d., at 1166. 
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probable cause that justified the search. Since such a war-
rant could have authorized the agents to open the rear por-
tion of the roadster and to rip the upholstery in their search 
for concealed whiskey, the search was constitutionally 
permissible. 
In Chambers v. Maroney the police found weapons and 
stolen property "concealed in a compartment under the dash-
board." 399 U. S., at 44. No suggestion was made that the 
scope of the search was impermissible. It would be illogical 
to assume that the outcome of Chambers-or the outcome of 
Carroll itself-would have been different if the police had 
found the secreted contraband enclosed within a secondary 
container and had opened that container without a warrant. 
If it was reasonable for prohibition agents to rip open the up-
holstery in Carroll, it certainly would have been reasonable 
for them to look into a burlap sack stashed inside; if it was 
reasonable to open the concealed compartment in Chambers, 
it would have been equally reasonable to open a paper bag 
crumpled within it. A contrary rule could produce absurd 
results inconsistent with the decision in Carroll itself. 
In its application of Carroll, this Court in fact has sus-
tained warrantless searches of containers found during a law-
ful search of an automobile. In Rusty v. United States, 282 
U. S. 694, the Court upheld a warrantless seizure of whiskey 
found during a search of an automobile, some of which was 
discovered in "whiskey bags" that could have contained other 
goods. 24 In Scher v. United States, 305 U. S. 251, federal of-
ficers seized and searched packages of unstamped liquor 
found in the trunk of an automobile searched without a war-
rant. As described by a police officer who participated in 
24 At the suppression hearing, defense counsel asked the police officer 
who had conducted the search: "Isn't it possible to put other goods in a bag 
that has the resemblance of a whiskey bag?" The officer responded: "I 
suppose it is. I did not think of that at that time. I knew it was whiskey, 
I was sure it was." App., O.T. 1930, No. 477, p. 27. 
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the search: "I turned the handle and opened the trunk and 
found the trunk completely filled with packages wrapped in 
brown paper, and tied with twine; I think somewhere around 
thirty packages, each one containing six bottles." 25 In these 
cases it was not contended that police officers needed a war-
rant to open the whiskey bags or to unwrap the brown paper 
packages. The fact that no such argument was even made 
illuminates the profession's understanding of the scope of the 
search permitted under Carroll. Indeed, prior to the deci-
sions in Chadwick and Sanders, courts routinely had held 
that containers and packages found during a legitimate war-
rantless search of an automobile also could be searched with-
out a warrant. 26 \ 
As we have stated, the decision in Carroll was based on 
the Court's appraisal of practical· considerations viewed in the 
perspective of history. It is therefore significant that the 
practical consequences of the Carroll decision would be 
largely nullified if the permissible scope of a warrantless 
25 App., O.T. 1938, No. 49, p. 33. The brief of then Solicitor General 
Robert Jackson noted that the items searched "were wrapped in very 
heavy brown wrapping paper with at least two wrappings and with a heavy 
cord around them cross-wise so that they could readily be lifted." Brief 
for United States, O.T. 1938, No. 49, p. 6. 
2"See, e. g., United States v. Soriano, 497 F. 2d 147, 149-150 (CA51974) 
(en bane); United States v. Vento, 533 F. 2d 838, 867, n. 101 (CA3 1976); 
United States v. Tramunti, 513 F. 2d 1087, 1104 (CA2 1975); United States 
v. Issod, 508 F. 2d 990, 993 (CA71974); United States v. Evans, 481 F. 2d 
990, 994 (CA9 1973); United States v. Bowman, 487 F. 2d 1229 (CAlO 
1973). Many courts continued to apply this rule following the decision in 
Chadwick. Cf. United States v. Milhollan, 599 F. 2d 518, 526-527 (CA3 
1979); United States v. Gaultney, 581 F. 2d 1137, 1144-1145 (CA5 1978); 
United States v. Finnegan, 568 F. 2d 637, 640-641 (CA9 1977). In ruling 
that police could search luggage and other containers found during a legiti-
mate warrantless search of an automobile, courts often assumed that the 
"automobile exception" of Carroll applied whenever a container in an auto-
mobile was believed to contain contraband. That view, of course, has 
since been qualified by Chadwick and Sanders. 
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search of an automobile did not include containers and pack-
ages found inside the vehicle. Contraband goods rarely are 
strewn across the trunk or floor of a car; since by their very 
nature such goods must be withheld from public view, they 
rarely can be placed in an automobile unless they are en-
closed within some form of container. 27 The Court in Carroll \ 
held that "contraband goods concealed and illegally trans-
ported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched for 
without a warrant." 267 U. S., at 153 (emphasis added). 
As we noted in Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 104, the 
decision in Carroll "merely relaxed the requirements for a 
warrant on grounds of impracticability." It neither broad-
ened nor limited the scope of a lawful search based on proba-
ble cause. 
A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the 
entire area in which the object of the search may be found 
and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of en-
try or opening may be required to complete the search. 28 
27 It is noteworthy that the early legislation on which the Court relied in 
Carroll concerned the enforcement of laws imposing duties on imported 
merchandise. See nn. 6 and 7, supra. Presumably such merchandise was 
shipped then in containers of various kinds, just as it is today. Since Con-
gress had authorized warrantless searches of vessels and beasts for im-
ported merchandise, it is inconceivable that it intended a customs officer to 
obtain a warrant for every package discovered during the search; certainly 
Congress intended customs officers to open shipping containers when nec-
essary and not merely to examine the exterior of cartons or boxes in which 
smuggled goods might be concealed. During virtually the entire history of 
our country-whether contraband was transported in a horse drawn car-
riage, a 1921 roadster, or a modern automobile-it has been assumed that a 
lawful search of a vehicle would include a search of any container that 
might conceal the object of the search. 
:?S In describing the permissible scope of a search of a home pursuant to a 
warrant, Professor LaFave notes: 
"Places within the described premises are not excluded merely because 
some additional act of entry or opening may be required. 'In countless 
cases in which warrants described only the land and the buildings, a search 
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Thus, a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home 
for illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets, 
chests, drawers, and containers in which the weapon might 
be found. A warrant to open a footlocker to search for mari-
juana would also authorize the opening of packages found in-
side. A warrant to search a vehicle would support a search 
of every part of the vehicle that might contain the object of 
the search. When a legitimate search is under way, and 
when its purpose and its limits have been precisely defined, 
nice distinctions between closets, drawers, and containers, in 
the case of a home, or between glove compartments, uphol-
stered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a 
vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt and effi-
cient completion of the task at hand. 29 
This rule applies equally to all containers, as indeed we be-
lieve it must. One point on which the Court was in virtually 
unanimous agreement in Robbins was that a constitutional 
distinction between "worthy" and "unworthy" containers 
would be improper. 30 Even though such a distinction per-
of desks, cabinets, closets and similar items has been permitted.'" 2 
LaFave, Search and Seizure 152 (1978) (quoting Massey v. Common-
wealth, 305 S. W. 2d 755, 756 (Ky. 1957)). 
29 The practical considerations that justify a warrantless search of an 
automobile continue to apply until the entire search of the automobile and 
its contents has been completed. Arguably, the entire vehicle itself could 
be searched without a warrant, with all containers found during that 
search then taken to a magistrate. Certainly no privacy interest is 
served, however, by prohibiting police from opening immediately a con-
tainer in which the object of the search may most likely be found and in-
stead forcing them first to comb the entire vehicle. Moreover, until the 
container itself was opened the police could never be certain that the con-
traband was not secreted in a yet undiscovered portion of the vehicle; thus 
in every case in which a container was found, the vehicle would need to be 
secured while a warrant was obtained. Such a requirement would be di-
rectly inconsistent with the decisions in Carroll and Chambers. Cf. nn. 19 
and 22, supra. 
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haps could evolve in a series of cases in which paper bags, 
locked trunks, lunch buckets, and orange crates were placed 
on one side of the line or the other, 31 the central purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment forecloses such a distinction. For 
just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely en-
titled to the same guarantees of privacy as the most majestic 
mansion, 32 so also may a traveler who carries a toothbrush 
and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf 
claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from official in-
spection as the sophisticated executive with the locked 
attache case. 
As Justice Stewart stated in Robbins, the Fourth Amend-
ment provides protection to the owner of every container 
that conceals its contents from plain view. -- U. S., at 
-- (plurality opinion). But the protection afforded by the 
Amendment varies in different settings. The luggage car-
ried by a traveler entering the country may be searched at 
random by a customs officer; the luggage may be searched no 
dissenting); id., at-- (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting); id., at-- (STE-
VENS, J., dissenting). 
31 If the distinction is based on the proposition that the Fourth Amend-
ment protects only those containers that objectively manifest an individ-
ual's reasonable expectation of privacy, however, the propriety of a war-
rantless search necessarily would turn on much more than the fabric of the 
container. A paper bag stapled shut and marked "private" might be found 
to manifest a reasonable expectation of privacy, as could a cardboard box 
stacked on top of two pieces of heavy luggage. The propriety of the war-
rantless search seemingly would turn on an objective appraisal of all the 
surrounding circumstances. 
32
" 'The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of 
the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow 
through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of En-
gland cannot enter-all his forces dares not cross the threshold of the 
ruined tenement!'" Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301, 307 (quoting 
remarks attributed to William Pitt); cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 
573, 601 n. 54. 
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matter how great the traveler's desire to conceal the contents 
may be. A container carried at the time of arrest often may 
be searched without a warrant and even without any specific \ 
suspicion concerning its contents. A container that may con-
ceal the object of a search authorized by a warrant may be 
opened immediately; the individual's interest in privacy must 
give way to the magistrate's official determination of proba-
ble cause. 
In the same manner, an individual's expectation of privacy 
in a vehicle and its contents may not survive if probable cause 
is given to believe that the vehicle is transporting contra-
band. Certainly the privacy interests in a car's trunk or 
glove compartment may be no less than those in a movable 
container. An individual undoubtedly has a significant inter-
est that the upholstery of his automobile will not be ripped or 
a hidden compartment within it opened. These interests 
must yield to the authority of a search, however, which-in 
light of Carroll-does not itself require the prior approval of 
a magistrate. The scope of a warrantless search based on 
probable cause is no narrower-and no broader-than the 
scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by prob-
able cause. Only the prior approval of the magistrate is 
waived; the search otherwise is as the magistrate could 
authorize. 
The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is 
not defined by the nature of the container in which the con-
traband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of 
the search and the places in which there is probable cause to 
believe that it may be found. Just as probable cause to be-
lieve that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will 
not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, proba-
ble cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being 
transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a 
suitcase. Probable cause to believe that a container placed -
\. 
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in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does t 
not justify a search of the entire cab. 
v 
Our decision today is inconsistent with the disposition in 
Robbins v. California and with some of the reasoning in Ar-
kansas v. Sanders. Nevertheless, the doctrine of stare deci-
sis does not preclude this action. Although we have rejected 
some of the reasoning in Sanders, we adhere to our holding in 
that case; although we reject the precise holding in Robbins, 
there was no Court opinion supporting a single rationale for 
its judgment and the reasoning we adopt today was not pre-
sented by the parties in that case. ~oreover, it is clear that 
no legitimate reliance interest can be frustrated by our deci-
sion today. 33 Of greatest importance, we are convinced that 
the rule we apply in this case is faithful to the interpretation 
of the Fourth Amendment that the Court has followed with 
substantial consistency throughout our history. 
We reaffirm the basic rule of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence stated by Justice Stewart for a unanimous Court in 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390: 
"The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable 
searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that 
'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without 
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a 
few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions.' Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (foot-
notes omitted).'' 
The exception recognized in Carroll is unquestionably one 
that is "specifically established and well-delineated." We 
33 Any interest in maintaining the status quo that might be asserted by \ 
persons who may have structured their business of distributing narcotics 
or other illicit substances on the basis of judicial precedents clearly would 
not be legitimate. 
,(}l 
80-2209---0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. ROSS 27 
hold that the scope of the warrantless search authorized by 
that exception is no broader and no narrower than a magis-
trate could legitimately authorize by warrant. If probable 
cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it jus-
tifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents 
that may conceal the object of the search. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The \ 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion . . 
It is so ordered. 
May 10, 1982 
80-2209 United States v. Ross 
DeC\r ,John: 
In effect, my vote at Conference was to "join 
five" to give a strong Court for a uniform rule in an area 
where law enforcement and courts need clear quidance. 
I think you have written an excP.Jlent ooinion. 
For the present, however, I will await the writing by other 
Justices. 
If I join you, I probably will write briefly in 
concurrence. Your opinion rejects some of the reasoning in 
Sanders, and particularly re1ects the view I have expressed 
several timeq as to the relevance of a "reasonable 
expectation of privacy". I continue to think that this is a 
relevant factor in Fourth Amen~ment analy~is. I therefore 
would not agree with all that you say in Part IV, but would 
try to join enough of your ooini.on to leave i_ ts basic 
holding supported by six Justices. 
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
May 10, 1982 
Re: 80-2209 - United States v. Ross 
Dear Lewis: 
Many thanks for your note. I hope it will be 
possible for you to join at least portions of the 
opinion. You are certainly correct in stating that I 
reject some of the reasoning in Sanders, but I did 
not intend to reject the relevance of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Indeed, perhaps without 
being as clear as I should have, I intended to direct 
pages 24 and 25 at that concept and to note that an 
individual's expectation of privacy in a vehicle and 
its contents varies dramatically in different 
settings. If specific language changes in that 
section might either satisfy your concerns or narrow 
any possible disagreement between us, I surely would 
do my best to accommodate you in the interest of 
making our disposition as unanimous as possible. 
(The changes between the first and second draft were 
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May 11, 1982 
Re: 80-2209 - United States v. Ross 
Dear John, 
I shall await the dissent. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
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.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
May 11' 1982 
No. 80-2209 United States v. Ross 
Dear John, 
Please join me in your opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
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May 19, 19.82 
Re: No. 80-2209 - U.S. v. R6ss 
Dear John: 
I will be joining you 1n this case, subject to a 
few suggestions which I doubt will give you any pro6lems. 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS Of' 
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JusTicE w ... J . BRENNAN, JR. May 20, 1982 
RE: No. 80-2209 United States v. Ross 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
. ....,. 
lfp/ss 05/24/82 Rider A, p. 25 (Ross) 
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Although an officer may establish that he acted in good 
faith in conducting th h b e searc Y other evidence, a warrant 
issued by a magistrate normally ff' su 1ces to establish it. 
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The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is 
not defined by the nature of the container in which the con-
traband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of 
the search and the places in which there is probable cause to 
believe that it may be found. Just as probable cause to be-
lieve that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will · =-- -=--
not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, proba-
ble cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being 
transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a 
silltcase. Probable cause to believe that a container placed 
in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does 
not justify a search of the entire cab. ~
"'In choosing to search without a warrant o 
probable cause, police officers of course lose the rotection that a warrant 
would provide to them in an action for damages rought by an individual .;? /! /} 
claiming that the search was unconstitutional. Cf. Bivens v. Six Un- _ /~ /../-
known Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388.fA-w~!ssue )'-a 
magistrate...will · generaliy-esta bliSht:hat"'>ffi~-ac~ed-iJrgood-faith-1n con-
ducting the-sear.eh. Cf. Carroll, supra, at 156 ("In cases where seizure is 
/- impossible except without warrant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully and 
~~t hi' peril unle>' he oan 'how the oowt p'Obable oause.'?. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
In my opinion in Robbins v. California, 
U.S. (1981), concurring in the judgment, I stated 
that the judgment was justified, though not compelled, by 
the Court's opinion in Arkansas v. Sander, 442 u.s. 756 
(1979). I did not agree, however, with the "bright line" 
rule articulated by the plurality opinion. Rather, I 
repeated the view I long have held that one's "reasonable 
expectation of privacy" is a particularly relevant factor 
in determining the validity of a warrantless search. I 
have recognized, that with respect to automobiles in 
general, this expectation can be only a limited one. See 
Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, at 7 61 ~ Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, 413 u.s. 266, 279 (Powell, J., concurring). 




reasonable expectation of privacy may be a decisive factor 
in a search case. 
It became evident last Term, however, from the 
five opinions written in Robbins - in none of which the 
Chief Justice joined - that it is essential to have a 
Court opinion in automobile search cases that provides 
"specific guidance to police and courts in this reoccuring 
situation". Robbins v. California, u.s. (1981) --
(Powell, J., concurring). The Court's opinion today, 
writ ten by Just ice Stevens and now joined by four other 
Justices, will afford this needed guidance. It is fair 
also to say that, given Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132 (19 __ ) and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (19 __ ), 
the Court's decision does not depart substantially from 
Fourth Amendment doctrine in automobile cases. Moreover, 
in enunciating a readily understood and applied rule, 
today's decision is consistent with the similar step taken 
last Term in Belton v. New York, u.s. (1981). --
I join the Court's opinion. 
May 25, J 982 
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The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is 
not defined by the nature of the container in which the con-
traband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of 
the search and the places in which there is probable cause to 
believe that it may be found. Just as probable cause to be-
lieve that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will 
not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, proba-
ble cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being 
transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a 
suitcase. Probable cause to believe that a container placed 
in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does 
not justify a search of the entire cab. _ __ ~
32 In choosing to search without a warrant o~ own assessment of 
probable cause, police officers of course lose the protection that a warrant 
would provide to them in an action for damageS' brought by an individual 
claiming that the search was unconstitutional. Cf. Bivens v. Six Un-
---
known Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388. ~~m:aiil~~""''Tlr+-~tl 
~ghl:.rate-->.ir.iU~~aU,~ • .iietaeli:!!irHtat offlc:e1 b ed;eEl iill g:gQd i1titb in c~>n­
d . Cf. Carroll, supra, at 156 ("In cases where seizure is 
impossible except without warrant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully and 
~~ at his peril unless he can show the court probable cause."). 
fv~· ct, 














From: Justice Powell 
MAY!&-
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 8{}-2209 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. 
ALBERT ROSS, JR. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
In my opinion in Robbins v. California,-- U.S. --
(1981), concurring in the judgment, I stated that the judg-
ment was justified, though not compelled, by the Court's 
opinion in Arkansas v. Sander, 442 U. S. 756 (1979). I did 
not agree, however, with the "bright line" rule articulated by 
the plurality opinion. Rather, I repeated the view I long 
have held that one's "reasonable expectation of privacy" is a 
particularly relevant factor in determining the validity of a 
warrantless search. I have recognized, that with respect to 
automobiles in general, this expectation can be only a limited 
one. See Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, at 761; Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 279 (POWELL, J., 
concurring). I continue to think that in many situations 
one's reasonable expectation of privacy may be a decisive fac-
tor in a search case. 
It became evident last Term, however, from the five opin-
ions written in Robbins-in none of which THE CHIEF Jus-
TICE joined-that it is essential to have a Court opinion in 
automobile search cases that provides "specific guidance to 
police and courts in this reoccuring situation". Robbins v. 
California,-- U. S. -- (1981) (POWELL, J., concurring). 
The Court's opinion today, written by JUSTICE STEVENS and 
now joined by four other Justices, will afford this needed 
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guidance. It is fair also to say that, given Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U. S. 132 (19-) and Chambers v. Maroney, 
399 U. S. 42 (19-), the Court's decision does not depart 
substantially from Fourth Amendment doctrine in automo-
bile cases. Moreover, in enunciating a readily understood 
and applied rule, today's decision is consistent with the simi-
lar step taken last Term in Belton v. New York, -- U. S. 
- (1981). 
I join the Court's opinion. 








From: Justice Stevens 
Circulated: _________ _ 
MAY 26 '82 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
5th DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-2209 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. 
ALBERT ROSS, JR. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1982] 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, the Court held 
that a warrantless search of an automobile stopped by police 
officers who had probable cause to believe the vehicle con-
tained contraband was not unreasonable within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment. The Court in Carroll did not ex-
plicitly address the scope of the search that is permissible. 
In this case, we consider the extent to which police officers-
who have legitimately stopped an automobile and who have 
probable cause to believe that contraband is concealed some-
where within it-may conduct a probing search of compart-
ments and containers within the vehicle whose contents are 
not in plain view. We hold that they may conduct a search of 
the vehicle that is as thorough as a magistrate could autho-
rize in a warrant "particularly describing the place to be 
searched." 1 
I 
In the evening of November 27, 1978, an informant who 
1 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affinnation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, / / "Lh d _ 
and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const., Arndt. 4. ~-( _,)C.._7 
"~S ~ ~ ~ ~t .3'2 ?6Me . ~ 
u r~'r · :::r 
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had previously proved to be reliable telephoned Detective 
Marcum of the District of Columbia Police Department and 
told him that an individual known as "Bandit" was selling 
narcotics kept in the trunk of a car parked at 439 Ridge 
Street. The informant stated that he had just observed 
"Bandit" complete a sale and that "Bandit" had told him that 
additional narcotics were in the trunk. The informant gave 
Marcum a detailed description of "Bandit" and stated that the 
car was a "purplish maroon" Chevrolet Malibu with District 
of Columbia license plates. 
Accompanied by Detective Cassidy and Sergeant Gon-
zales, Marcum immediately drove to the area and found a ma-
roon Malibu parked in front of 439 Ridge Street. A license 
check disclosed that the car was registered to Albert Ross; a 
computer check on Ross revealed that he fit the informant's 
description and used the alias "Bandit." In two passes 
through the neighborhood the officers did not observe anyone 
matching the informant's description. To avoid alerting per-
sons on the street, they left the area. 
The officers returned five minutes later and observed the 
maroon Malibu turning off Ridge Street onto Fourth Street. 
They pulled alongside the Malibu, noticed that the driver 
matched the informant's description, and stopped the car. 
Marcum and Cassidy told the driver-later identified as Al-
bert Ross, the respondent in this action-to get out of the ve-
hicle. While they searched Ross, Sergeant Gonzales discov-
ered a bullet on the car's front seat. He searched the 
interior of the car and found a pistol in the glove compart-
ment. Ross then was arrested and handcuffed. Detective 
Cassidy took Ross' keys and opened the trunk, where he 
found a closed brown paper bag. He opened the bag and dis-
covered a number of glassine bags containing a white pow-
der. Cassidy replaced the bag, closed the trunk, and drove 
the car to Headquarters. 
At the police station Cassidy thoroughly searched the car. 
In addition to the "lunch-type" brown paper bag, Cassidy 
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found in the trunk a zippered red leather pouch. He un-
zipped the pouch and discovered $3,200 in cash. The police 
laboratory later determined that the powder in the paper bag 
was heroin. No warrant was obtained. 
Ross was charged with possession of heroin with intent to 
distribute, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841(a). Prior to trial, 
he moved to suppress the heroin found in the paper bag and 
the currency found in the leather pouch. After an eviden-
tiary hearing, the District Court denied the motion to sup-
press. The heroin and currency were introduced in evidence 
at trial and Ross was convicted. 
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the 
conviction. It held that the police had probable cause to stop 
and search Ross' car and that, under Carroll v. United 
States, supra, and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, the 
officers lawfully could search the automobile-including its 
trunk-without a warrant. The court considered sepa-
rately, however, the warrantless search of the two containers 
found in the trunk. On the basis of Arkansas v. Sanders, 
442 U. S. 753, the court concluded that the constitutionality 
of a warrantless search of a container found in an automobile 
depends on whether the owner possesses a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in its contents. Applying that test, the 
court held that the warrantless search of the paper bag was 
valid but the search of the leather pouch was not. The court 
remanded for a new trial at which the items taken from the 
paper bag, but not those from the leather pouch, could be 
admitted. 2 
The entire Court of Appeals then voted to rehear the case 
en bane. A majority of the court rejected the panel's conclu-
sion that a distinction of constitutional significance existed 
2 The court rejected the Government's argument that the warrantless 
search of the leather pouch was justified as incident to respondent's arrest. 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 137a. The Government has not challenged this 
holding. 
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between the two containers found in respondent's trunk; it 
held that the police should not have opened either container 
without first obtaining a warrant. The court reasoned: 
"No specific, well-delineated exception called to our 
attention permits the police to dispense with a warrant 
to open and search 'unworthy' containers. Moreover, 
we believe that a rule under which the validity of a war-
rantless search would turn on judgments about the dura-
bility of a container would impose an unreasonable and 
unmanageable burden on police and courts. For these 
reasons, and because the Fourth Amendment protects 
all persons, not just those with the resources or fastidi-
ousness to place their effects in containers that decision-
makers would rank in the luggage line, we hold that the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement forbids the 
warrantless opening of a closed, opaque paper bag to the 
same ·extent that it forbids the warrantless opening of a 
small unlocked suitcase or a zippered leather pouch." 
655 F. 2d 1159, 1161 (CADC 1981) (footnote omitted). 
The en bane Court of Appeals considered, and rejected, the 
argument that it was reasonable for the police to open both 
the paper bag and the leather pouch because they were enti-
tled to conduct a warrantless search of the entire vehicle in 
which the two containers were found. The majority con-
cluded that this argument was foreclosed by Sanders. 
Three dissenting judges interpreted Sanders differently. 3 
Other courts also have read the Sanders opinion in different 
3 Judge Tamm, the author of the original panel opinion, reiterated the 
view that Sanders prohibited the warrantless search of the leather pouch 
but not the search of the paper bag. Judge Robb agreed that this result 
was compelled by Sanders, although he stated that in his opinion "the right 
to search an automobile should include the right to open any container 
found within the automobile, just as the right to search a lawfully arrested 
prisoner carries with it the right to examine the contents of his wallet and 
any envelope found in his pocket, and the right to search a room includes 
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ways. 4 Moreover, disagreement concerning the proper in-
terpretation of Sanders was at least partially responsible for 
the fact that Robbins v. California,-- U. S. --,was de-
cided last Term without a Court opinion. 
There is, however, no dispute among judges about the im-
portance of striving for clarification in this area of the law. 
For countless vehicles are stopped on highways and public 
streets every day and our cases demonstrate that it is not un-
common for police officers to have probable cause to believe 
that contraband may be found in a stopped vehicle. In every 
such case a conflict is presented between the individual's con-
stitutionally protected interest in privacy and the public in-
terest in effective law enforcement. No single rule of law 
can resolve every conflict, but our conviction that clarifica-
tion is feasible led us to grant the Government's petition for 
certiorari in this case and to invite the parties to address the 
question whether the decision in Robbins should be reconsid-
ered. -- U. S. --. 
II 
We begin with a review of the decision in Carroll itself. 
In the fall of 1921, federal prohibition agents obtained evi-
dence that George Carroll and John Kiro were "bootleggers" 
authority to open and search all the drawers and containers found within 
the room." 655 F. 2d, at 1180. Judge MacKinnon concurred with Judge 
Tamm that Sanders did not prohibit the warrantless search of the paper 
bag. Concerning the leather pouch, he agreed with Judge Wilkey, who 
dissented on the ground that Sanders should not be applied retroactively. 
' Many courts have held that Sanders requires that a warrant be ob-
tained only for personal luggage and other "luggage-type" containers. 
See, e. g., United States v. Goshorn, 628 F. 2d 697 (CAl 1980); United 
States v. Brown, 635 F. 2d 1207 (CA6 1980); United States v. Jiminez, 626 
F. 2d 39 (CA71980). One court has held that Sanders does not apply if the 
police have probable cause to search an entire vehicle and not merely an 
isolated container within it. Cf. State v. Bible, 389 So. 2d 42 (La. 1980), 
remanded, 453 U. S. 918; State v. Hernandez, 408 So. 2d 911 (La. 1981); 
see also United States v. Ross, 655 F. 2d, at 1180 (Robb, J., dissenting). 
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who frequently traveled between Grand Rapids and Detroit 
in an Oldsmobile Roadster. 5 On December 15, 1921, the 
agents unexpectedly encountered Carroll and Kiro driving 
west on that route in that car. The officers gave pursuit, 
stopped the roadster on the highway, and directed Carroll 
and Kiro to get out of the car. 
No contraband was visible in the front seat of the Oldsmo-
bile and the rear portion of the roadster was closed. One of 
the agents raised the rumble seat but found no liquor. He 
raised the seat cushion and again found nothing. The officer 
then struck at the "lazyback" of the seat and noticed that it 
was "harder than upholstery ordinarily is in those backs." 
267 U. S., at 174. He tore open the seat cushion and discov-
ered 68 bottles of gin and whiskey concealed inside. No war-
rant had been obtained for the search. 
Carroll and Kiro were convicted of transporting intoxicat-
ing liquor· in violation of the National Prohibition Act. On 
review of those convictions, this Court ruled that the war-
rantless search of the roadster was reasonable within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In an extensive opinion 
written by Chief Justice Taft, the Court held: 
"On reason and authority the true rule is that if the 
search and seizure without a warrant are made upon 
probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising 
out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an 
automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is 
subject to seizure and destruction, the search and sei-
5 On September 29, 1921, Carroll and Kiro met the agents in Grand Rap-
ids and agreed to sell them three cases of whiskey. The sale was not con-
summated, however, possibly because Carroll learned the agents' true 
identity. In October, the agents discovered Carroll and Kiro driving the 
Oldsmobile Roadster on the road to Detroit, which was known as an active 
center for the introduction of illegal liquor into this country. The agents 
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zure are valid. The Fourth Amendment is to be con-
strued in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable 
search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner 
which will conserve public interests as well as the inter-
ests and rights of individual citizens." !d., at 149. 
The Court explained at length the basis for this rule. The 
Court noted that historically warrantless searches of vessels, 
wagons, and carriages-as opposed to fixed premises such as 
a home or other building-had been considered reasonable by 
Congress. After reviewing legislation enacted by Congress 
between 1789 and 1799,6 the Court stated: 
"Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 
Fourth Amendment we find in the first Congress, and in 
the following Second and Fourth Congresses, a differ-
ence made as to the necessity for a search warrant be-
tween goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a 
dwelling house or similar place, and like goods in course 
of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel 
where they readily could be put out of reach of a search 
warrant." I d., at 151. 
The Court reviewed additional legislation passed by Con-
gress 7 and again noted that 
"the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches 
and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been con-
6 The legislation authorized customs officials to search any ship or vessel 
without a warrant if they had probable cause to believe that it concealed 
goods subject to duty. The same legislation required a warrant for 
searches of dwelling places. 267 U. S. , at 150-151. 
7 In particular, the Court noted an 1815 statute that permitted customs 
officers not only to board and search vessels without a warrant "but also to 
stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom 
they should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty or 
had been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to 
law." Id., at 151. 
8 
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strued, practically since the beginning of the Govern-
ment, as recognizing a necessary difference between a 
search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in re-
spect of which a proper official warrant readily may be 
obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or 
automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practi-
cable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be 
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which 
the warrant must be sought." ld., at 153. 
Thus, since its earliest days Congress had recognized the 
impracticability of securing a warrant in cases involving the 
transportation of contraband goods. 8 It is this impractica-
bility, viewed in historical perspective, that provided the 
basis for the Carroll decision. Given the nature of an auto-
mobile in transit, the Court recognized that an immediate in-
trusion is .necessary if police officers are to secure the illicit 
substance. In this class of cases, the Court held that a war-
rantless search of an automobile is not unreasonable. 9 
8 In light of this established history, individuals always had been on no-
tice that movable vessels may be stopped and searched on facts giving rise 
to probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband, without the protec-
tion afforded by a magistrate's prior evaluation of those facts. 
9 Subsequent cases make clear that the decision in Carroll was not based 
on the fact that the only course available to the police was an immediate 
search. As Justice Harlan later recognized, although a failure to seize a 
moving automobile believed to contain contraband might deprive officers of 
the illicit goods, once a vehicle itself has been stopped the exigency does 
not necessarily justify a warrantless search. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 
U. S. 42, 62-64 (opinion of Harlan, J.). The Court in Chambers, how-
ever-with only Justice Harlan dissenting-refused to adopt a rule that 
would permit a warrantless seizure but prohibit a warrantless search. 
The Court held that if police officers have probable cause to justify a war-
rantless seizure of an automobile on a public roadway, they may conduct an 
immediate search of the contents of that vehicle. "For constitutional pur-
poses, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a 
car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the 
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In defining the nature of this "exception" to the general 
rule that "[i]n cases where the securing of a warrant is rea-
sonably practicable, it must be used," id., at 156, the Court in 
Carroll emphasized the importance of the requirement that 
officers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle con-
tains contraband. 
"Having thus established that contraband goods con-
cealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other 
vehicle may be searched for without a warrant, we come 
now to consider under what circumstances such search 
may be made. It would be intolerable and unreasonable 
if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every auto-
mobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus subject all 
persons lawfully using the highways to the inconve-
nience and indignity of such a search. Travellers may 
be so stopped in crossing an international boundary be-
cause. of national self protection reasonably requiring one 
probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S., at 52. 
The Court also has held that if an immediate search on the street is per-
missible without a warrant, a search soon thereafter at the police station is 
permissible if the vehicle is impounded. Chambers, supra; Texas v. 
White, 423 U. S. 67. These decisions are based on the practicalities of the 
situations presented and a realistic appraisal of the relatively minor protec-
tion that a contrary rule would provide for privacy interests. Given the 
scope of the initial intrusion caused by a seizure of an automobile-which 
often could leave the occupants stranded on the highway-the Court re-
jected an inflexible rule that would force police officers in every case either 
to post guard at the vehicle while a warrant is obtained or to tow the vehi-
cle itself to the station. Similarly, if an immediate search on the scene 
could be conducted, but not one at the station if the vehicle is impounded, 
police often simply would search the vehicle on the street-at no advantage 
to the occupants, yet possibly at certain cost to the police. The rules as 
applied in particular cases may appear unsatisfactory. They reflect, how-
ever, a reasoned application of the more general rule that if an individual 
gives the police probable cause to believe a vehicle is transporting contra-
band, he loses the right to proceed on his way without official interference. 
10 
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entering the country to identify himself as entitled to 
come in, and his belongings as effects which may be law-
fully brought in. But those lawfully within the country, 
entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free 
passage without interruption or search unless there is 
known to a competent official authorized to search, prob-
able cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying 
contraband or illegal merchandise." Id., at 153-154. 
Moreover, the probable cause determination must be based 
on objective facts that could justify the issuance of a warrant 
by a magistrate and not merely on the subjective good faith 
of the police officers. "'[A]s we have seen, good faith is not 
enough to constitute probable cause. That faith must be 
grounded on facts within knowledge of the [officer], which in 
the judgment of the court would make his faith reasonable.'" 
Id., at 161-162 (quoting Director General v. Kastenbaum, 
263 u. s. 25, 28). 10 
In short, the exception to the warrant requirement estab-
lished in C arroU.-the scope of which we consider in this 
case-applies only to searches of vehicles that are supported 
by probable cause. 11 In this class of cases, a search is not un-
10 After reviewing the relevant authorities at some length, the Court con-
cluded that the probable cause requirement was satisfied in the case before 
it. The Court held that "the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were 
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief 
that intoxicating liquor was being transported in the automobile which 
they stopped and searched." !d., at 162. Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 
338 U.S. 160, 17&-177; Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102. 
"See Husky v. United States, 282 U. S. 694; Scher v. United States, 305 
U. S. 251; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160; Henry v. United 
States, 361 U. S. 98; Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U. S. 216; Cham-
bers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42; Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67; Colorado v. 
Bannister, 449 U. S. 1. 
Warrantless searches of automobiles have been upheld in a variety of 
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reasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of 
a warrant, even though a warrant has not actually been 
obtained. 12 
III 
The rationale justifying a warrantless search of an automo-
bile that is believed to be transporting contraband arguably 
applies with equal force to any movable container that is be-
lieved to be carrying an illicit substance. That argument, 
however, was squarely rejected in United States v. Chad-
wick, 433 U. S. 1. 
Chadwick involved the warrantless search of a 200-pound 
footlocker. Federal railroad officials in San Diego became 
suspicious when they noticed that a brown footlocker loaded 
onto a train bound for Boston was unusually heavy and leak-
ing talcum powder, a substance often used to mask the odor 
of marijuana. Narcotics agents met the train in Boston and 
a trained police dog signaled the presence of a controlled sub-
stance inside the footlocker. While the agents awaited fur-
ther developments, respondent Chadwick arrived and the 
footlocker was placed in the trunk of Chadwick's automobile. 
Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58; Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433; 
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364. Many of these searches do not 
require a showing of probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband. 
We are not called upon-and do not-consider in this case the scope of the 
warrantless search that is permitted in those cases. 
'
2 As the Court in Carroll concluded: 
"We here find the line of distinction between legal and illegal seizures of 
liquor in transport in vehicles. It is certainly a reasonable distinction. It 
gives the owner of an automobile or other vehicle seized under Section 26, 
in absence of probable cause, a right to have restored to him the automo-
bile, it protects him under the Weeks and Amos cases from use of the liquor 
as evidence against him, and it subjects the officer making the seizures to 
damages. On the other hand, in a case showing probable cause, the Gov-
ernment and its officials ~e given the opportunity which they should have, 
to make the investigation necessary to trace reasonably suspected contra-
band goods and to seize them." 267 U. S., at 156. 
80-2209-0PINION 
12 UNITED STATES v. ROSS 
At that point, while the trunk of the car was still open and 
before the engine had been started, the agents seized the 
footlocker. They later searched the footlocker without a 
warrant and discovered a large quantity of marijuana. 
In a subsequent criminal proceeding, Chadwick claimed 
that the warrantless search of the footlocker violated the 
Fourth Amendment. In the District Court, the Government 
argued that as soon as the footlocker was placed in the auto-
mobile a warrantless search was permissible under Carroll. 
The District Court rejected that argument, 13 and the Govern-
ment did not pursue it on appeal. 14 Rather, the Government 
contended in this Court that the warrant requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment applied only to searches of homes and 
other "core" areas of privacy. The Court unanimously re-
jected that contention. 15 Writing for the Court, THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE stated: 
"[I]f there is little evidence that the Framers intended 
the Warrant Clause to operate outside the home, there is 
no evidence at all that they intended to exclude from pro-
tection of the Clause all searches occurring outside the 
home. The absence of a contemporary outcry against 
13 The District Court noted: 
"In this case, there was no nexus between the search and the automobile, 
merely a coincidence. The challenged search in this case was one of a foot-
locker, not an automobile. The search took place not in an automobile, but 
in [the federal building]. The only connection that the automobile had to 
this search was that, prior to its seizure, the footlocker was placed on the 
floor of an automobile's open trunk." United States v. Chadwick, 393 
F. Supp. 763, 772 (Mass. 1975). 
"This Court specifically noted: "The Government does not contend that 
the footlocker's brief contact with Chadwick's car makes this an automobile 
search, but it is argued that the rationale of our automobile search cases 
demonstrates the reasonableness of permitting warrantless searches of 
luggage; the Government views such luggage as analagous to motor vehi-
cles for Fourth Amendment purposes." 433 U. S., at 11-12. 
'
6 See id., at 17 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). 
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warrantless searches in public places was because, aside 
from searches incident to arrest, such warrantless 
searches were not a large issue in colonial America. 
Thus, silence in the historical record tells us little about 
the Framers' attitude toward application of the Warrant 
Clause to the search of respondents' footlocker. What 
we do know is that the Framers were men who focused 
on the wrongs of that day but who intended the Fourth 
Amendment to safeguard fundamental values which 
would far outlast the specific abuses which gave it 
birth." 433 U. S., at S-9 (footnote omitted). 
The Court in Chadwick specifically rejected the argument 
that the warrantless search was "reasonable" because a foot-
locker has some of the mobile characteristics that support 
warrantless searches of automobiles. The Court recognized 
that "a person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage 
are substantially greater than in an automobile," id., at 13, 
and noted that the practical problems associated with the 
temporary detention of a piece of luggage during the period 
of time necessary to obtain a warrant are significantly less 
than those associated with the detention of an automobile. 
!d., at 13, n. 7. In ruling that the warrantless search of the 
footlocker was unjustified, the Court reaffirmed the general 
principle that closed packages and containers may not be 
searched without a warrant. Cf. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 
727; United States v. Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249. In sum, the 
Court in Chad wick declined to extend the rationale of the 
"automobile exception" to permit a warrantless search of any 
movable container found in a public place. 16 
16 The Court concluded that there is a significant difference between the 
seizure of a sealed package and a subsequent search of its contents; the 
search of the container in that case was "a far greater intrusion into Fourth 
Amendment values than the impoundment of the footlocker." I d., at 13, 
n. 8. A temporary seizure of a package or piece of luggage often may be 
accomplished without as significant an intrusion upon the individual-and 
80-2209-0PINION 
14 UNITED STATES v. ROSS 
The facts in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, were sim-
ilar to those in Chadwick. In Sanders, a Little Rock police 
officer received information from a reliable informant that 
Sanders would arrive at the local airport on a specified flight 
that afternoon carrying a green suitcase containing mari-
juana. The officer went to the airport. Sanders arrived on 
schedule and retrieved a green suitcase from the airline bag-
gage service. Sanders gave the suitcase to a waiting com-
panion who placed it in the trunk of a taxi. Sanders and his 
companion drove off in the cab; police officers followed and 
stopped the t~xi several blocks from the airport. The offi-
cers opened the trunk, seized the suitcase, and searched it on 
the scene without a warrant. As predicted, the suitcase con-
tained marijuana. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless 
search of the suitcase was impermissible under the Fourth 
Amendment, and this Court affirmed. As in Chadwick, the 
mere fact that the suitcase had been placed in the trunk of 
the vehicle did not render the automobile exception of Car-
roll applicable; the police had probable cause to seize the suit-
case before it was placed in the trunk of the cab and did not 
have probable cause to search the taxi itself. 17 Since the 
suitcase had been placed in the trunk, no danger existed that 
its contents could have been secreted elsewhere in the vehi-
cle. 18 As THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted in his opinion concurring 
in the judgment: 
without as great a burden on the police-as in the case of the seizure of an 
automobile. See n. 9, supra. 
17 The Arkansas Supreme Court carefully reviewed the facts of the case 
and concluded: "The information supplied to the police by the confidential 
informant is adequate to support the State's claim that the police had prob-
able cause to believe that appellant's green suitcase contained a controlled 
substance when the police confiscated the suitcase and opened it." 262 
Ark. 595, 599, 559 S. W. 2d 704, 706 (1977). The court also noted: "The 
evidence in this case supports the conclusion that the relationship between 
the suitcase and the taxicab is coincidental." ld., at 600, n. 2, 559 S.W. 
2d, at 706. 
18 Moreover, none of the practical difficulties associated with the deten-
tion of a vehicle on a public highway that made the immediate search in 
,I 
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"Because the police officers had probable cause to be-
lieve that respondent's green suitcase contained mari-
juana before it was placed in the trunk of the taxicab, 
their duty to obtain a search warrant before opening it is 
clear under United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 
(1977). 
Here, as in Chadwick, it was the luggage being trans-
ported by respondent at the time of the arrest, not the 
automobile in which it was being carried, that was the 
suspected locus of the contraband. The relationship be-
tween the automobile and the contraband was purely co-
incidental, as in Chadwick. The fact that the suitcase 
was resting in the trunk of the automobile at the time of 
respondent's arrest does not turn this into an 'automo-
bile' exception case. The Court need say no more." 
ld., at 766-767. 
The Court in Sanders did not, however, rest its decision 
solely on the authority of Chadwick. In rejecting the State's 
argument that the warrantless search of the suitcase was jus-
tified on the ground that it had been taken from an automo-
bile lawfully stopped on the street, the Court broadly sug-
gested that a warrantless search of a container found in an 
automobile could never be sustained as part of a warrantless 
search of the automobile itself. 19 The Court did not suggest 
Carroll reasonable could justify an immediate search of the suitcase, since 
the officers had no interest in detaining the taxi or its driver. 
'
9 The Court stated that "the extent to which the Fourth Amendment ap-
plies to containers and other parcels depends not at all upon whether they 
are seized from an automobile." 442 U. S., at 764, n. 13. This general 
rule was limited only by the observation that "[n]ot all containers and pack-
ages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the full pro-
tection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a 
kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any 
reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred 
from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a 
package will be open to 'plain view,' thereby obviating the need for a war-
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that it mattered whether probable cause existed to search 
the entire vehicle. It is clear, however, that in neither 
Chadwick nor Sanders did the police have probable cause to 
search the vehicle or anything within it except the footlocker 
in the former case and the green suitcase in the latter. 
Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, however, was a case 
in which suspicion was not directed at a specific container. 
In that case the Court for the first time was forced to con-
sider whether police officers who are entitled to conduct a 
warrantless search of an automobile stopped on a public road-
way may open a container found within the vehicle. In the 
early morning of January 5, 1975, police officers stopped 
Robbins' station wagon because he was driving erratically. 
Robbins got out of the car, but later returned to obtain the 
vehicle's registration papers. When he opened the car door, 
the officers smelled marijuana smoke. One of the officers 
searched Robbins and discovered a vial of liquid; in a search 
of the interior of the car the officer found marijuana. The 
police officers then opened the tailgate of the station wagon 
and raised the cover of a recessed luggage compartment. In 
the compartment they found two packages wrapped in green 
opaque plastic. The police unwrapped the packages and dis-
covered a large amount of marijuana in each. 
Robbins was charged with various drug offenses and 
moved to suppress the contents of the plastic packages. 
The California Court of Appeal held that "[s]earch of the 
automobile was proper when the officers learned that appel-
lant was smoking marijuana when they stopped him" 20 and 
that the warrantless search of the packages was justified be-
cause "the contents of the packages could have been inferred 
from their outward appearance, so that appellant could not 
have held a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to 
the contents." 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 40, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780, 
783 (1980). 
rant." Ibid. 
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This Court reversed. Writing for a plurality, Justice 
Stewart rejected the argument that the outward appearance 
of the packages precluded Robbins from having a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their contents. He also squarely 
rejected the argument that there is a constitutional distinc-
tion between searches of luggage and searches of "less wor-
thy'' containers. Justice Stewart reasoned that all contain-
ers are equally protected by the Fourth Amendment unless 
their contents are in plain view. The plurality concluded 
that the warrantless search was impermissible because 
Chadwick and Sanders had established that "a closed piece of 
luggage found in a lawfully searched car is constitutionally 
protected to the same extent as are closed pieces of luggage 
found anywhere else." 453 U. S., at 425. 
In a concurring opinion, JUSTICE POWELL, the author of 
the Court's opinion in Sanders, stated that "[t]he plurality's 
approach strains the rationales of our prior cases and imposes 
substantial· burdens on law enforcement without vindicating 
any significant values of privacy." Id., at 429. 21 He noted 
21 "While the plurality's blanket warrant requirement does not even pur-
port to protect any privacy interest, it would impose substantial new bur-
dens on law enforcement. Confronted with a cigar box or a Dixie cup in 
the course of a probable cause search of an automobile for narcotics, the 
conscientious policeman would be required to take the object to a magis-
trate, fill out the appropriate forms, await the decision, and finally obtain a 
warrant. Suspects or vehicles normally will be detained while the war-
rant is sought. This process may take hours, removing the officer from his 
normal police duties. Expenditure of such time and effort, drawn from 
the public's limited resources for detecting or preventing crimes, is justi-
fied when it protects an individual's reasonable privacy interests. In my 
view, the plurality's requirement cannot be so justified. The aggregate 
burden of procuring warrants whenever an officer has probable cause to 
search the most trivial container may be heavy and will not be compen-
sated by the advancement of important Fourth Amendment values." 453 
U. S., at 433-434 (POWELL, J., concurring). 
The substantial burdens on law enforcement identified by JUSTICE Pow-
ELL would, of course, not be affected by the character of the container 
found during an automobile search. No comparable practical problems 
arise when the official suspicion is confined to a particular piece of luggage, 
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that possibly "the controlling question should be the scope of 
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement," id., at 
435, and explained that under that view 
"when the police have probable cause to search an auto-
mobile, rather than only to search a particular container 
that fortuitously is located in it, the exigencies that allow 
the police to search the entire automobile without a war-
rant support the warrantless search of every container 
found therein. See post, at 451 and n. 13 (STEVENS, J., 
dissenting). This analysis is entirely consistent with the 
holdings in Chadwick and Sanders, neither of which is an 
'automobile case,' because the police there had probable 
cause to search the double-locked footlocker and the suit-
case respectively before either came near an automo-
bile." Ibid. 
The parti~s in Robbins had not pressed that argument, how-
ever, and JusTICE POWELL concluded that institutional con-
straints made it inappropriate to re-examine basic doctrine 
without full adversary presentation. He concurred in the 
judgment, since it was supported-although not compelled-
by the Court's opinion in Sanders, and stated that a future 
case might present a better opportunity for thorough consid-
eration of the basic principles in this troubled area. 
That case has arrived. Unlike Chadwick and Sanders, in 
this case police officers had probable cause to search respond-
ent's entire vehicle. 22 Unlike Robbins, in this case the par-
as in Chadwick and Sanders. Cf. n. 19, supra. 
22 The en bane Court of Appeals stated that "[b]ased on the tip the police 
received, Ross's car was properly stopped and searched, and the pouch and 
bag were properly seized." 655 F. 2d, at 1168 (footnote omitted). The 
court explained: 
"[W]e believe it clear that the police had ample and reasonable cause to 
stop Ross and to search his car. The informer had supplied accurate in-
formation on prior occasions, and he was an eyewitness to sales of narcotics 
by Ross. He said he had just seen Ross take narcotics from the trunk of 
J 
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ties have squarely addressed the question whether, in the 
course of a legitimate warrantless search of an automobile, 
police are entitled to open containers found within the vehi-
cle. We now address that question. Its answer is deter-
mined by the scope of the search that is authorized by the ex-
ception to the warrant requirement set forth in Carroll. 
IV 
In Carroll itself, the whiskey that the prohibition agents 
seized was not in plain view. It was discovered only after an 
officer opened the rumble seat and tore open the upholstery 
of the lazyback. The Court did not find the scope of the 
search unreasonable. Having stopped Carroll and Kiro on a 
public road and subjected them to the indignity of a vehicle 
search-which the Court found to be a reasonable intrusion 
on their privacy because it was based on probable cause that 
their vehicle was transporting contraband-prohibition 
agents were entitled to tear open a portion of the roadster 
itself. The scope of the search was no greater than a magis-
trate could have authorized by issuing a warrant based on the 
probable cause that justified the search. Since such a war-
rant could have authorized the agents to open the rear por-
tion of the roadster and to rip the upholstery in their search 
for concealed whiskey, the search was constitutionally 
permissible. 
In Chambers v. Maroney the police found weapons and 
stolen property "concealed in a compartment under the dash-
board." 399 U. S., at 44. No suggestion was made that the 
scope of the search was impermissible. It would be illogical 
to assume that the outcome of Chambers-or the outcome of 
his car in making a sale and heard him say he possessed additional narcot-
ics." !d., at 1168, n. 22. 
The court further noted that "[i]n this case, the informant told the police 
that Ross had narcotics in the trunk of his car. No specific container was 
identified." !d., at 1166. 
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Carroll itself-would have been different if the police had 
found the secreted contraband enclosed within a secondary 
container and had opened that container without a warrant. 
If it was reasonable for prohibition agents to rip open the up-
holstery in Carroll, it certainly would have been reasonable 
for them to look into a burlap sack stashed inside; if it was 
reasonable to open the concealed compartment in Chambers, 
it would have been equally reasonable to open a paper bag 
crumpled within it. A contrary rule could produce absurd 
results inconsistent with the decision in Carroll itself. 
In its application of Carroll, this Court in fact has sus-
tained warrantless searches of containers found during a law-
ful search of an automobile. In Husty v. United States, 282 
U. S. 694, the Court upheld a warrantless seizure of whiskey 
found during a search of an automobile, some of which was 
discovered in "whiskey bags" that could have contained other 
goods. 23 In Scher v. United States, 305 U. S. 251, federal of-
ficers seized and searched packages of unstamped liquor 
found in the trunk of an automobile searched without a war-
rant. As described by a police officer who participated in 
the search: "I turned the handle and opened the trunk and 
found the trunk completely filled with packages wrapped in 
brown paper, and tied with twine; I think somewhere around 
thirty packages, each one containing six bottles." 24 In these 
cases it was not contended that police officers needed a war-
rant to open the whiskey bags or to unwrap the brown paper 
za At the suppression hearing, defense counsel asked the police officer 
who had conducted the search: "Isn't it possible to put other goods in a bag 
that has the resemblance of a whiskey bag?" The officer responded: "I 
suppose it is. I did not think of that at that time. I knew it was whiskey, 
I was sure it was." App., O.T. 1930, No. 477, p. 27. 
24 App. , O.T. 1938, No. 49, p. 33. The brief of then Solicitor General 
Robert Jackson noted that the items searched "were wrapped in very 
heavy brown wrapping paper with at least two wrappings and with a heavy 
cord around them cross-wise so that they could readily be lifted." Brief 
for United States, O.T. 1938, No. 49, p. 6. 
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packages. These decisions nevertheless "have much weight, 
as they show that this point neither occurred to the bar or the 
bench." Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 
88 (Marshall, C. J.). The fact that no such argument was 
even made illuminates the profession's understanding of the 
scope of the search permitted under Carroll. Indeed, prior 
to the decisions in Chad'Wick and Sanders, courts routinely 
had held that containers and packages found during a legiti-
mate warrantless search of an automobile also could be 
searched without a warrant. 25 
As we have stated, the decision in Carroll was based on 
the Court's appraisal of practical considerations viewed in the 
perspective of history. It is therefore significant that the 
practical consequences of the Carroll decision would be 
largely nullified if the permissible scope of a warrantless 
search of an automobile did not include containers and pack-
ages found inside the vehicle. Contraband goods rarely are 
strewn across the trunk or floor of a car; since by their very 
nature such goods must be withheld from public view, they 
rarely can be placed in an automobile unless they are en-
closed within some form of container. 26 The Court in Carroll 
25 See, e. g., United States v. Soriano, 497 F. 2d 147, 14~150 (CA5 1974) 
(en bane); United States v. Vento, 533 F . 2d 838, 867, n. 101 (CA3 1976); 
United States v. Tramunti , 513 F . 2d 1087, 1104 (CA2 1975); United States 
v. Issod, 508 F . 2d 990, 993 (CA7 1974); United States v. Evans, 481 F. 2d 
990, 994 (CA9 1973); United States v. Bowman, 487 F. 2d 1229 (CAlO 
1973). Many courts continued to apply this rule following the decision in 
Chadwick. Cf. United States v. Milhollan, 599 F. 2d 518, 526--527 (CA3 
1979); United States v. Gaultney, 581 F. 2d 1137, 1144-1145 (CA5 1978); 
United States v. Finnegan, 568 F. 2d 637, 640-641 (CA9 1977). In ruling 
that police could search luggage and other containers found during a legiti-
mate warrantless search of an automobile, courts often assumed that the 
"automobile exception" of Carroll applied whenever a container in an auto-
mobile was believed to contain contraband. That view, of course, has 
since been qualified by Chadwick and Sanders. 
2S It is noteworthy that the early legislation on which the Court relied in 
Carroll concerned the enforcement of laws imposing duties on imported 
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held that "contraband goods concealed and illegally trans-
ported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched for 
without a warrant." 267 U. S., at 153 (emphasis added). 
As we noted in Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 104, the 
decision in Carroll "merely relaxed the requirements for a 
warrant on grounds of impracticability." It neither broad-
ened nor limited the scope of a lawful search based on proba-
ble cause. 
A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the 
entire area in which the object of the search may be found 
and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of en-
try or opening may be required to complete the search. 27 
Thus, a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home 
for illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets, 
chests, drawers, and. containers in which the weapon might 
be found. A warrant to open a footlocker to search for mari-
juana would also authorize the opening of packages found in-
merchandise. See nn. 6 and 7, supra. Presumably such merchandise was 
shipped then in containers of various kinds, just as it is today. Since Con-
gress had authorized warrantless searches of vessels and beasts for im-
ported merchandise, it is inconceivable that it intended a customs officer to 
obtain a warrant for every package discovered during the search; certainly 
Congress intended customs officers to open shipping containers when nec-
essary and not merely to examine the exterior of cartons or boxes in which 
smuggled goods might be concealed. During virtually the entire history of 
our country-whether contraband was transported in a horse drawn car-
riage, a 1921 roadster, or a modern automobile-it has been assumed that a 
lawful search of a vehicle would include a search of any container that 
might conceal the object of the search. 
27 In describing the permissible scope of a search of a home pursuant to a 
warrant, Professor LaFave notes: 
"Places within the described premises are not excluded merely because 
some additional act of entry or opening may be required. 'In countless 
cases in which warrants described only the land and the buildings, a search 
of desks, cabinets, closets and similar items has been permitted.' " 2 
LaFave, Search and Seizure 152 (1978) (quoting Massey v. Common-
wealth, 305 S.W. 2d 755, 756 (Ky. 1957)). 
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side. A warrant to search a vehicle would support a search 
of every part of the vehicle that might contain the object of 
the search. When a legitimate search is under way, and 
when its purpose and its limits have been precisely defined, 
nice distinctions between closets, drawers, and containers, in 
the case of a home, or between glove compartments, uphol-
stered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a 
vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt and effi-
cient completion of the task at hand. 28 
This rule applies equally to all containers, as indeed we be-
lieve it must. One point on which the Court was in virtually 
unanimous agreement in Robbins was that a constitutional 
distinction between "worthy" and "unworthy" containers 
would be improper. 29 Even though such a distinction per-
haps could evolve in a series of cases in which paper bags, 
locked trunks, lunch -buckets, and orange crates were placed 
on one side of the line or the other, 30 the central purpose of 
28 The practical considerations that justify a warrantless search of an 
automobile continue to apply until the entire search of the automobile and 
its contents has been completed. Arguably, the entire vehicle itself (in-
cluding its upholstery) could be searched without a warrant, with all 
wrapped articles and containers found during that search then taken to a 
magistrate. But prohibiting police from opening immediately a container 
in which the object of the search is most likely to be found and instead forc-
ing them first to comb the entire vehicle would actually exacerbate the in-
trusion on privacy interests. Moreover, until the container itself was 
opened the police could never be certain that the contraband was not se-
creted in a yet undiscovered portion of the vehicle; thus in every case in 
which a container was found, the vehicle would need to be secured while a 
warrant was obtained. Such a requirement would be directly inconsistent 
with the rationale supporting the decisions in Carroll and Chambers. Cf. 
nn. 19 and 22, supra. 
29 Cf. 453 U. S., at 426-427 (plurality opinion); id., at 436 (BLACKMUN, J., 
dissenting); id., at 443 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting); id. , at 447 (STEVENS, 
J., dissenting). 
30 If the distinction is based on the proposition that the Fourth Amend-
ment protects only those containers that objectively manifest an individ-
ual's reasonable expectation of privacy, however, the propriety of a war-
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the Fourth Amendment forecloses such a distinction. For 
just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely en-
titled to the same guarantees of privacy as the most majestic 
mansion, 31 so also may a traveler who carries a toothbrush 
and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf 
claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from official in-
spection as the sophisticated executive with the locked 
attache case. 
As Justice Stewart stated in Robbins, the Fourth Amend-
ment provides protection to the owner of every container 
that conceals its contents from plain view. 453 U. S., at 427 
(plurality opinion). But the protection afforded by the 
Amendment varies in different settings. The luggage car-
ried by a traveler entering the country may be searched at 
random by a customs officer; the luggage may be searched no 
matter how great the traveler's desire to conceal the contents 
may be. A container carried at the time of arrest often may 
be searched without a warrant and even without any specific 
suspicion concerning its contents. A container that may con-
ceal the object of a search authorized by a warrant may be 
opened immediately; the individual's interest in privacy must 
give way to the magistrate's official determination of proba-
ble cause. 
In the saine manner, an individual's expectation of privacy 
rantless search necessarily would turn on much more than the fabric of the 
container. A paper bag stapled shut and marked "private" might be found 
to manifest a reasonable expectation of privacy, as could a cardboard box 
stacked on top of two pieces of heavy luggage. The propriety of the war-
rantless search seemingly would turn on an objective appraisal of all the 
surrounding circumstances. 
3
' " 'The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of 
the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow 
through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of En-
gland cannot enter-all his forces dares not cross the threshold of the 
ruined tenement!'" Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301, 307 (quoting 
remarks attributed to William Pitt); cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 
573, 601 n. 54. 
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in a vehicle and its contents may not survive if probable cause 
is given to believe that the vehicle is transporting contra-
band. Certainly the privacy interests in a car's trunk or 
glove compartment may be no less than those in a movable 
container. An individual undoubtedly has a significant inter-
est that the upholstery of his automobile will not be ripped or 
a hidden compartment within it opened. These interests 
must yield to the authority of a search, however, which-in 
light of C arroU-does not itself require the prior approval of 
a magistrate. The scope of a warrantless search based on 
probable cause is no narrower-and no broader-than the 
scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by prob-
able cause. Only the prior approval of the magistrate is 
waived; the search otherwise is as the magistrate could 
authorize. 32 
The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is 
not defined by the nature of the container in which the con-
traband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of 
the search and the places in which there is probable cause to 
believe that it may be found. Just as probable cause to be-
lieve that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will 
not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, proba-
ble cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being 
transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a 
suitcase. Probable cause to believe that a container placed 
in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does 
not justify a search of the entire cab. 
v 
Our decision today is inconsistent with the disposition in 
112 In choosing to search without a warrant on their own assessment of 
probable cause, police officers of course lose the protection that a warrant 
would provide to them in an action for damages brought by an individual 
claiming that the search was unconstitutional. Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 
U. S. 167. Although an officer may establish that he acted in good faith in 
conducting the search by other evidence, a warrant issued by a magistrate 
normally suffices to establish it. 
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Robbins v. California and with the portion of the opinion in 
Arkansas v. Sanders on which the plurality in Robbins re-
lied. Nevertheless, the doctrine of stare decisis does not 
preclude this action. Although we have rejected some of the 
reasoning in Sanders, we adhere to our holding in that case; 
although we reject the precise holding in Robbins, there was 
no Court opinion supporting a single rationale for its judg-
ment and the reasoning we adopt today was not presented by 
the parties in that case. Moreover, it is clear that no legiti-
mate reliance interest can be frustrated by our decision to-
day. 33 Of greatest importance, we are convinced that the 
rule we apply in this case is faithful to the interpretation of 
the Fourth Amendment that the Court has followed with 
substantial consistency throughout our history. 
We reaffirm the basic rule of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence stated by Justice Stewart for a unanimous Court in 
Mincey v: Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390: 
"The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable 
searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that 
'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without 
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a 
few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions.' Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (foot-
notes omitted)." 
The exception recognized in Carroll is unquestionably one 
that is "specifically established and well-delineated." We 
hold that the scope of the warrantless search authorized by 
that exception is no broader and no narrower than a magis-
trate could legitimately authorize by warrant. If probable 
33 Any interest in maintaining the status quo that might be asserted by 
persons who may have structured their business of distributing narcotics 
or other illicit substances on the basis of judicial precedents clearly would 
not be legitimate. 
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cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it jus-
tifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents 
that may conceal the object of the search. 
. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-2209 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. 
ALBERT ROSS, JR. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
In my opinion in Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 429 
(1981), concurring in the judgment, I stated that the judg-
ment was justified, though not compelled, by the Court's 
opinion in Arkansas v. Sander, 442 U. S. 753 (1979). I did 
not agree, however, with the "bright line" rule a1 '"iculated by 
the plurality opinion. Rather, I repeated the view I long 
have held that one's "reasonable expectation of privacy" is a 
particularly relevant factor in determining the validity of a 
warrantless search. I have recognized, that with respect to 
automobiles in general, this expectation can be only a limited 
one. See Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, at 761; Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 279 (1973) (Pow-
ELL, J., concurring). I continue to think that in many situa-
tions one's reasonable expectation of privacy may be a 
decisive factor in a search case. 
It became evident last Term, however, from the five opin-
ions written in Robbins-in none of which THE CHIEF Jus-
TICE joined-that it is essential to have a Court opinion in 
automobile search cases that provides "specific guidance to 
police and courts in this reoccuring situation". Robbins v. 
California, 453 U. S. at, 435 (PowELL, J., concurring). The 
Court's opinion today, written by JUSTICE STEVENS and now 
joined by four other Justices, will afford this needed guid-
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ance. It is fair also to say that, given Carroll v. United 
States , 267 U. S. 132 (1925) and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 
U. S. 42 (1970), the Court's decision does not depart substan-
tially from Fourth Amendment doctrine in automobile cases. 
Moreover, in enunciating a readily understood and applied 
rule, today's decision is consistent with the similar step taken 
last Term in Belton v. New York, 453 U. S. 454 (1981). 
I join the Court's opinion. 
v-, ~ ... 
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